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INTRODUCTION
Even if we accept that the most basic rules of fair play do not apply
to our nation’s political representatives when they battle one another in
the ordinary lawmaking process, we should demand more when they
engage in constitutional decision-making. 1 This Article explains why
our constitutional system demands different rules of engagement when
constitutional questions are at issue, and exactly what we should expect
of members of Congress in these situations.
Congress does a surprisingly large amount of constitutional
decision-making: it is the main ingredient of some important
lawmaking (such as determining whether a governmental interest is
1 This Article’s thesis does not depend upon the behavioral standards of ordinary politics
being as low as they presently seem to be, but only on there being a gap between the standards
that apply to ordinary politics and constitutional decision-making. See infra Part III, note 150.
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sufficiently important to justify regulating speech), and a key
component of many of Congress’s non-legislative responsibilities (such
as deciding whether to impeach a government official, or to move
forward with a president’s nominations). 2 The Constitution itself
differentiates between statutory and constitutional lawmaking by
specifying a special procedure for the latter in Article V. 3 This Article’s
Special Norms Thesis extends this basic approach to the much more
common practice of constitutional decision-making by Congress
outside the amendment process. 4
This Article’s central claim is that the existence of Special Norms
for constitutional decision-making is implicit in the widely shared
understanding of what a constitution is and the work it performs in a
large, heterogeneous modern democracy. 5 Special Norms are necessary
to adequately legitimate governmental authority, to establish the type of
political fraternity that modern democracies seek, and to decide a
constitutional democracy’s foundational political identity. 6 But while
Special Norms are appropriate for constitutional decision-making, they
should not apply to all of Congress’s decision-making. Extending the
Special Norms to everything is not only impractical but would reflect a
misunderstanding of what ordinary politics consists. 7

See infra Part I.
See U.S. CONST. art. V.
4 Like Bruce Ackerman’s We the People trilogy, this Article distinguishes between
constitutionalism and ordinary politics, and focuses on constitutional practices outside of
Article V. But our projects are otherwise quite different: Ackerman aims to develop a rule-ofrecognition for identifying constitutional amendments made outside of Article V, see BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 15–31 (1998); is mostly concerned with
citizens’ roles in such extra-Article V amendments, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS 7 (1991); and provides an account that is primarily “descriptive, not
prescriptive,” see Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of
Bruce Ackerman’s Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REV. 759, 776 (1992)
(describing Ackerman’s We the People).
5 In another work I have advanced an independent, yet complementary, argument for the
existence of Special Norms for constitutional decision-making. See Mark D. Rosen, History:
Limit or License in Constitutional Adjudication? (Apr. 27, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author) (grounding special norms in a ‘shared agency’ account of constitutionalism).
6 See infra Sections III.C–E.
7 See infra Section III.B.
2
3
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The Article then identifies three Special Norms that should apply
to Congress. 8 The norms of Proactivity and Explicitness are gatekeepers that determine when Congress must engage in constitutional
decision-making. Proactivity sometimes requires that Congress act, and
Explicitness is a defeasible duty that Congress forthrightly consider
constitutional questions when they arise. The third norm, Tempered
Politics, governs congressional behavior in the realm of constitutional
decision-making. Tempered Politics disallows the brute majoritarianism
that is permissible in ordinary politics, instead requiring persuasion and
compromise in the service of achieving consensus. When consensus
cannot be reached, Tempered Politics demands decisions that are more
responsible and civic-minded than what might be minimally acceptable
in ordinary politics. Tempered Politics is operationalized by two subnorms: (1) Reciprocity, which constrains disputants’ substantive
positions, and (2) Communicative Exchange, which disallows
unilateralism by requiring that each side aim-to-influence, and be opento-being-influenced by, its opponent’s constitutional views.
More generally, the Special Norms aim to harness Congress’s
unique institutional capacities that should be brought to the multiinstitutional process (comprising courts, the executive branch, the
legislature, and the states) that collectively generates constitutional
judgments. The Special Norms facilitate the making of constitutional
decisions that are, one might say, constitution-worthy.
This Article is particularly timely for both practical and theoretical
reasons. As to the practical, the Special Norms Thesis offers a
framework that may help tame the excessive political partisanship and
vicious divisiveness that has captured our political institutions. 9 Though
the Special Norms discipline applies to only a subset of congressional
action, constitutional decision-making is a crucial subset. Moreover,
responsible and respectful decision-making in the constitutional
domain might have beneficial cascading effects elsewhere. And even if
today’s political climate is not receptive to the adoption of Special
Norms,10 the Special Norms Thesis can help us better understand how
See infra Part IV.
See STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE (2018).
10 See infra notes 70–89 and accompanying text (discussing some mechanisms through
which the Special Norms might become binding).
8
9
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we have gotten to where we are and how we might reshape our practice
of constitutional politics in the future. As to the theoretical, among this
generation of constitutional scholars’ most profound insights is that
courts are not the only institutions that interpret 11 the Constitution. 12
Yet virtually no one to date has considered whether Congress’s great
powers to interpret and apply the Constitution are accompanied by a
great responsibility 13 when it does so. 14 The Special Norms Thesis
answers with a resounding “yes.” 15
The Special Norms Thesis is fully independent of (albeit consistent
with) the United States’ practice of strong judicial review, where the
Supreme Court has the last authoritative word on what the Constitution
means. 16 As Part I shows, Congress still must engage in substantial

11 Later I explain why “decision-making” is broader than, and conceptually superior to, the
locution of “interpretation.” See infra notes 166–68 and accompanying text.
12 See sources cited infra note 166.
13 The language above paraphrases “with great power comes great responsibility,” which
was likely penned by Voltaire but brought to the attention of most Americans by Peter Parker’s
Uncle Ben in the movie Spider-Man. SPIDER-MAN (Columbia Pictures 2002).
14 Paul Brest’s seminal Articles provided helpful, but only limited, guidance. See infra note
153 (discussing Paul Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter
Judicial Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REV. 57 (1986)); infra note 182 (discussing Paul Brest, The
Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1974)).
David Pozen goes considerably further when he argues that the concept of bad faith, as it has
been developed in private and international law, should be applied to Congress’s
interpretations of constitutional law. See David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV.
L. REV. 885, 887–89 (2016). Pozen’s project and this Article are complementary though distinct.
The Special Norms Thesis reasons on the basis of considerations that are unique to
constitutionalism rather than transsubstantively. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
The contents of constitutional bad faith and the Special Norms only partly overlap. See infra
notes 30, 217 and accompanying text. And an implication of the Special Norms Thesis is that
bad faith is an inadequate conceptual framework for describing the behavioral standards that
should govern constitutional decision-making. See infra note 217.
15 While this Article develops its claims in relation to Congress, it has broader implications
insofar as the Special Norms Thesis reasons from the consensus fundamentals of constitutional
systems. Future work will explain how the Special Norms Thesis applies to other individuals
and institutions that engage in constitutional decision-making (such as the President, executive
agencies, and state governments), and to what extent the Special Norms Thesis carries over to
other countries.
16 See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346,
1353–59 (2006) (distinguishing between strong and weak judicial review). The Special Norms
Thesis might allay concerns that the rejection of strong judicial review might otherwise
occasion.
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amounts of constitutional decision-making concerning matters for
which courts provide little or no guidance. The choice between strong
and weak judicial review affects the size of the domain of the
legislature’s constitutional decision-making 17 but not the norms that
should govern that domain.
More generally, the Special Norms Thesis’s claim that Congress
should conduct itself specially when engaging in constitutional decisionmaking neither presupposes nor determines the type of review a court
should give to Congress’s constitutional decisions. The three Special
Norms this Article identifies guide Congress, and only Congress. As
such, the Special Norms supplement, but do not displace, the legal
doctrines that courts apply. 18 Nonetheless, the Special Norms Thesis
may have implications for how judicial review should be
operationalized. For example, compliance with the Special Norms may
increase the deference-worthiness of Congress’s constitutional
judgments.
The Article unfolds in six parts. Part I identifies the domain of
Congress’s constitutional decision-making, showing both that it is larger
than typically understood and that it goes far beyond what is naturally
understood to consist of “constitutional interpretation.” Part II clarifies
the status of the Special Norms. They are not themselves constitutional
requirements,19 constitutional conventions, 20 or even non-constitutional
positive law. Rather, the Special Norms are norms: behavioral standards
that should discipline members of Congress, even if they are not positive
law. 21 The Special Norms are not presently binding on Congress because
they have neither been widely accepted nor are they generally complied
with. But, as is true of all norms, the Special Norms could arise and
Weak judicial review, where courts’ constitutional judgments do not ipso facto trump the
legislature’s, expands the domain. See id. at 1355–56.
18 Whereas courts’ legal doctrines may be conceptualized as the script that courts follow,
the Special Norms are Congress’s script. Each institution plays a distinct role, and, when acting
together, they comprise the multi-institution system that ultimately determines what the
Constitution allows, requires, and prohibits.
19 With one exception. See infra Section IV.B.
20 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
991, 999 (2008) (defining constitutional convention as “a practice that is widely understood as a
settlement of a constitutional question and that is regular or stable over time”).
21 Norms can be codified in positive law but need not be. See infra notes 57–58 and
accompanying text.
17
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become binding in the future, outside of formal lawmaking
mechanisms, if they become generally accepted and are largely complied
with. 22 The Article aims to serve as a “norm-entrepreneur” that seeks to
“chang[e] social norms.”23
Parts III–V comprise the Article’s analytic core. Part III provides
five arguments for the Special Norms Thesis’s negative claim that
Congress’s constitutional decision-making should not be taken under
the thin constraints that apply during ordinary politics. Part IV
establishes the Special Norms Thesis’s affirmative claim by fleshing out
the contents of the Special Norms that should discipline Congress’s
constitutional decision-making. 24 Part V responds to four possible
objections to the Special Norms Thesis, including the criticism that it is
too impractical. 25 In so doing, Part V clarifies how the Special Norms
operate in difficult cases and identifies the Special Norms’ likely costs.
Part VI provides a final accounting of the Special Norms Thesis’s
benefits and costs. That accounting is the predicate for the Article’s all-

22 Even after this, the Special Norms should not be judicially enforceable, though they
might be enforced by Congress. See infra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
23 See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909 (1996).
As such, the Special Norms Thesis does not depend on the historical facts of Congress’s current
or past practices. But while not determinative, such historical facts might prove illuminating.
For even if contemporary congressional practice bears little resemblance to the Special Norms,
earlier congresses may have substantially comported with the Special Norms Thesis when they
considered constitutional questions. See generally DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN
CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1801 (1997) (describing an extended time during
which Congress seems to have approached its constitutional decision-making with care and
responsibility); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS,
1801–1829 (2001) (same); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DEMOCRATS
AND WHIGS, 1829–1861 (2005) (same); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS:
DESCENT INTO THE MAELSTROM, 1829–1861 (2005) (same); Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on
the Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1021, 1076 (2006) (referring to the so-called Decision
of 1789 as “an episode when Congress approached its constitutional duties with deliberation,
sincerity, and sophistication”). Bruce Ackerman’s “constitutional moments,” when the People
engage in informal constitutional amendment, likewise are characterized by decision-making
that is more responsible and public-oriented than what occurs during ordinary political times.
See infra note 182 and accompanying text. In future work, I plan to examine to what extent the
Special Norms Thesis reflects, or is in tension with, the historical practice of American
constitutionalism.
24 The Special Norms Thesis’s negative claim applies to all governmental institutions, while
its affirmative claim is institution-sensitive. See supra note 15.
25 See supra Section V.D.
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things-considered conclusion that the Special Norms should discipline
Congress’s constitutional decision-making.
I. THE DOMAIN OF CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION-MAKING
The Special Norms Thesis depends upon an understanding of the
domain to which the Special Norms apply. The congressional activity
most straightforwardly falling within the constitutional domain is
“propos[ing] Amendments to this Constitution” and specifying whether
ratification is to be by state legislatures or state conventions. 26 But
Congress’s role in producing new constitutional text does not exhaust
its constitutional decision-making. A wide range of post-production
activities—actions having nothing to do with amending the
Constitution’s text—requires that Congress engage in constitutional
decision-making. Such constitutional decision-making may ultimately
generate legislation or lead to the conclusion that a bill should not be
enacted. And a large part of Congress’s post-production constitutional
decision-making has nothing to do with creating statutes.
Because the domain of Congress’s constitutional decision-making
is far broader than amending the Constitution, Article V’s
supermajority requirement, which demands higher-than-ordinary
consensus, is not applicable to most of Congress’s constitutional
decision-making. Only the Special Norms discipline Congress’s postproduction constitutional decision-making.27 It is important to be clear
about what falls into this category.
A.

The ‘May’ Question

26 See U.S. CONST. art. V. This Article does not consider the Special Norms Thesis’s
relationship to the initial drafting and ratification of a constitution. In fact, the Special Norms
Thesis may not apply, or at the very least may apply differently, to a constitution’s creation. See
generally Rosen, History: Limit or License, supra note 5. Accordingly, Michael Klarman’s
masterful, partially deflationary account of the drafting and ratification of the U.S. Constitution
has no direct bearing on the Special Norms Thesis. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’
COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2016); see also supra note 23
(providing another reason why historical facts cannot disprove the Special Norms Thesis).
27 Both the Special Norms and Article V apply to Congress’s activities in connection with
amending the Constitution.
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One circumstance of post-production congressional constitutional
decision-making is the threshold determination of whether the
Constitution allows Congress to undertake an action it is contemplating.
This determination has two constitutional components: (1) whether the
Constitution grants Congress power to undertake the contemplated
action, and, if so, (2) whether some constitutional limit disallows the
action. These power and limit determinations together answer what
might be called the may question of whether Congress may act.
Answering the may question is an activity that belongs to the domain of
constitutional decision-making. Answering the may question belongs to
post-production decision-making because it is not connected to altering
constitutional text.
Answering the may question does not itself result in any affirmative
congressional action whatsoever: the answer does not generate
legislation 28 or any other congressional action. An affirmative answer to
the may question opens the door to two other questions that jointly
determine what, if anything, Congress does: the whether question (of
whether Congress should act), and (if so) the what question (of what
exactly Congress should do). Almost always, answering the whether and
what questions consists of wholly non-constitutional decision-making.
For instance, once it is determined that Congress has power to enact tax
legislation, whether Congress passes tax reform and what reform it
should pass exclusively belong to the domain of non-constitutional
politics.
So, while all congressional action contains at least one
constitutional ingredient—an answer to the may question—whether
Congress acts and what it does are almost always determined by wholly
non-constitutional considerations. But not always.
B.

The ‘Whether’ and ‘What’ Questions

Determining whether Congress should act sometimes belongs to
the constitutional domain. So, sometimes, does determining what
Congress should do. These are additional circumstances, beyond

28

Though a negative answer to the may question should lead to congressional inaction.
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General Properties of the Whether and What Questions

The whether and what questions have several interesting, nonobvious properties. First, each question’s legal status (constitutional or
non-constitutional) is fully independent of the other: only one, both, or
neither may belong to the constitutional domain. As indicated above,
most of the time the whether and what questions belong to the nonconstitutional domain. Other times, however, constitutional
considerations determine whether Congress must act, though they do
not determine what Congress must do; in such a circumstance, the
whether question belongs to the constitutional domain, while the what
question inhabits the domain of ordinary politics. Other times,
constitutional considerations do not require congressional action, but
the substance of Congress’s discretionary action is determined by
constitutional considerations. And sometimes constitutional
considerations both demand congressional action and determine what
those actions should be.
Next, the whether question is always binary—in each instance it
belongs either to the constitutional or non-constitutional domain. This
is because constitutional considerations either require congressional
action or they do not. By contrast, the what question may belong to both
domains insofar as constitutional considerations may be among the
determinants of what Congress should do. When only some of the what
questions’ determinants belong to the constitutional domain, the Special
Norms Thesis applies only to those constitutional determinants.
There are two broad circumstances when the whether and what
questions belong to the constitutional domain: in relation to (1) tending
to constitutionally-created or constitutionally-recognized institutions
(institution-tending) and (2) tending to constitutional rights (rightstending).
2.

Institution-Tending

The Constitution creates an array of federal institutions (including
Congress, the presidency, and the Supreme Court) and recognizes pre-
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existing institutions (most importantly the states). These institutions
must be tended to if they are to survive and function. Congress’s
institution-tending takes one of three forms: enabling, building-out, or
protecting these institutions. Much of Congress’s institution-tending
belongs to the domain of post-production constitutional decisionmaking.
a.

Enabling Constitutional Institutions

Congress’s constitutionally-assigned powers sometimes need to be
exercised if other constitutionally-created or recognized institutions are
to be properly enabled. Determining whether it should exercise these
enabling powers, and many ingredients of the determination of what it
should do, belong to the constitutional domain.
For example, the Constitution vests the Senate with the power to
give “Advice and Consent” concerning the President’s nominees for
officers of the United States. 29 Because officers are necessary for the
executive and judicial branches to properly function, the confirmation
of nominees belongs to the constitutional domain. This does not mean
that a Senator’s confirmation decision is guided exclusively by
constitutional considerations. But it does mean that the confirmation
decision comprises multiple constitutional ingredients. Those
constitutional components are not limited to the trivial may question of
whether the Senate has power to give advice and consent: Of course it
does. But because officers are necessary for the executive and judicial
branches to be properly enabled, the whether question also belongs to
the constitutional domain. So, whereas political considerations alone
determine whether Congress should enact tax reform, 30 the same is not
true as regards Congress’s confirmation decisions. Likewise,
components of the what question (i.e., as to whether a particular
nomination ought to be confirmed) can include constitutional
components.

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
A decision guided solely by the norms of ordinary politics, which permits no-holdsbarred warfare and obstructionism, accordingly, would not violate the Special Norms. By
contrast, Pozen argues that obstructionist behavior in relation to ordinary politics can run afoul
of constitutional bad faith. See Pozen, supra 14, at 929–30.
29
30
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Impeachment is another circumstance of constitutional decisionmaking that belongs to the category of enabling constitutional
institutions. Improper exercise of the impeachment power can underenable or over-enable an institution, depending on the circumstance.
Intemperate or unprincipled exercises of the impeachment power risk
under-enabling constitutional institutions insofar as undue fears of
impeachment may paralyze, or otherwise interfere with, officers subject
to Congress’s impeachment powers. Improperly aggressive exercise of
the impeachment power also risks under-enabling the republican
character of our government insofar as it would unduly disturb citizens’
electoral choices. In the other direction, Congress’s refusal to impeach
can disable constitutional institutions. Improper refusal to impeach
risks usurpations of power by the impeachment-worthy officer (overenabling), as well as long-term damage to the prestige and power of the
institution occupied by the impeachment-worthy officer (underenabling). For these reasons, the whether question in relation to
impeachment, as well as many ingredients of the what question, belong
to the constitutional domain.
b.

Building-out Constitutional Institutions

Many constitutional institutions are substantially underspecified by
the Constitution and, for that reason, require building-out. 31 Congress
has power to build-out these institutions by enacting statutes. 32 Though
the build-outs themselves are not constitutional text, many of the
considerations that inform them—both the whether and many of the
what determinations—belong to the constitutional domain.
For example, Congress has power under the Constitution’s Effects
Clause 33 to enact choice-of-law legislation that would determine when a
forum state may apply its own law rather than a sister state’s. 34 Such
legislation would literally help construct our system of horizontal
31 Here, I adopt and extend Jack Balkin’s helpful locution of building-out. See JACK M.
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 5–6 (2011).
32 Congress is not the only governmental institution with build-out power. For example,
President Washington played this role in respect of the presidency. See Stephen E. Sachs, The
“Unwritten Constitution” and Unwritten Law, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1797, 1806–08.
33 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
34 See Mark D. Rosen, Choice-of-Law as Non-Constitutional Federal Law, 99 MINN. L. REV.
1017, 1093–95 (2015).
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federalism in two respects. First, such legislation would create the
necessary legal infrastructure that is called for by the states’ political
relationships. When a dispute straddles more than one state, there
frequently arise difficult choice-of-law questions as to which state’s law
applies. Such uncertainty is undesirable and often leads to costly
litigation battles that muck up our interstate system. A federal choiceof-law statute that resolved such uncertainties would build-out our
system of horizontal federalism by providing legal infrastructure that
would help operationalize our interstate system. 35
Second, choice-of-law legislation has the power to literally
determine the fundamental character of the sister states’ political
relations. 36 States may have diverse policies in relation to matters as to
which neither the Constitution nor federal law demands nationwide
uniformity. 37 But one state’s restrictive law (say, a ban on a certain type
of gambling) often can be substantially undermined if its citizens can
simply cross a border and avail themselves of a sister state’s more
permissive laws. 38 States can address this risk of circumvention if they
can extraterritorially apply their laws to their citizens when they are outof-state. The Effects Clause gives Congress power to decide whether and
when states have this extraterritorial power. 39 Congress’s decision
(which it has not yet made) would be a substantial determinant of what
type of federal union we have: should we have a union in which states
can require their citizens to conform with their idiosyncratic laws
wherever they might find themselves, or a union in which the citizen of
any state may avail himself of the law of any other state simply by
traveling there? 40 Determining whether to create choice-of-law
See id. at 1088–92.
Such a statute may also help protect the system of horizontal federalism insofar as clarity
may reduce interstate tensions. For a sustained analysis of the many ways Congress might build
out horizontal federalism, see Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations,
120 HARV. L. REV. 1468 (2007).
37 Mark D. Rosen, “Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism?: Positive, Normative, and Institutional
Considerations of States’ Extraterritorial Powers, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 713, 745 (2007)
[hereinafter Rosen, “Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism?].
38 Id. at 745.
39 See Mark D. Rosen, Marijuana, State Extraterritoriality, and Congress, 58 B.C. L. REV.
1013, 1020–24 (2017) [hereinafter Rosen, Marijuana].
40 See Rosen, “Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism?, supra note 37; Rosen, Marijuana, supra note 39,
at 1016–17.
35
36
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legislation, 41 and many considerations that influence what its contents
should be, accordingly belong to the constitutional domain. 42 Such
legislation would be part of the post-production constitutional work of
building-out our country’s horizontal federalist system.
c.

Protecting Constitutional Institutions

The institutions that the Constitution recognizes and creates can
come under threat, and for that reason may require Protection.
Determining whether constitutional institutions require Protection,
and, if so, what should be done, fall within the constitutional domain.
Congress’s powers and responsibilities under the Guarantee Clause are
an example of congressional decision-making that belongs to this
constitutional category. The Constitution provides that “[t]he United
States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government . . . .”43 Under contemporary doctrine, the Guarantee
Clause is a non-justiciable political question whose enforcement rests
exclusively with Congress. 44 Thus constitutional doctrine recognizes
that it is Congress’s responsibility to determine if a state does not have a
republican form of government, and, if so, what should be done.
Answering these whether and what questions belongs to the
constitutional domain. 45 What results from this instance of Congress’s
constitutional decision-making might be a statute, 46 or something else
entirely. For example, Congress has enforced the Guarantee Clause by
refusing to seat people elected from states that Congress did not deem to
be republican. 47
3.

Rights-Tending

41 See infra Section IV.B (discussing the circumstances that give rise to a constitutional duty
for congress to act).
42 See Rosen, Marijuana, supra note 39, at 1031–37.
43 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
44 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217–21 (1962).
45 For other examples of protecting constitutional institutions, see Mark D. Rosen, Can
Congress Play a Role in Remedying Dysfunctional Political Partisanship?, 50 IND. L. REV. 265,
269–74 (2016) (discussing Congress’s role in protecting the constitutionally-created and
recognized institutions of representative democracy in federal and state governments).
46 See id. at 269–73.
47 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 366 (2005).
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The Constitution creates an array of rights that also must be tended
to if they are to survive and function. Congress’s rights-tending takes
one of two forms: adequately realizing constitutional rights and
resolving conflicts. Much of the decision-making connected to rightstending belongs to the domain of post-production constitutional
decision-making.
a.

Adequately Realizing Constitutional Rights

The rights declared in the Constitution’s text can be inadequately
realized in the real world relative to a minimal plausible baseline of what
the constitutional right appropriately entails. 48 Consider the Fifteenth
Amendment’s guarantee that the right to vote not be denied or abridged
on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. For nearly
a century after the Fifteenth Amendment’s adoption, state laws
prevented a substantial percentage of African-American citizens from
voting. 49 Congress properly plays a role in determining whether a
constitutional right is adequately realized, and that determination falls
within the domain of constitutional decision-making. If Congress
believes a right is inadequately realized, many determinants of its
decision of what it should do likewise belong to the constitutional
domain. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 50 is an example of Congress’s
post-production constitutional decision-making so as to Adequately
Realize constitutional rights.
b.

Resolving Conflicts

Two types of conflicts can arise in relation to constitutional rights.
First, virtually all constitutional rights are non-absolute in the sense that
they can be regulated to achieve sufficiently important countervailing
interests. 51 For example, strict scrutiny permits a right to be regulated or
48 See generally LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE (2004).
49 See generally SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW
OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 69–84 (3d ed. 2007); DAVID A.
STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 128–29 (2010).
50 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965)
51 For a thorough exploration of this property of rights, see Mark D. Rosen, When Are NonAbsolute Constitutional Rights McCutcheon, Conflicts, and the Sufficiency Question, 56 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1535 (2015).
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infringed to pursue a compelling government interest. 52 In so doing,
strict scrutiny understands there can be conflicts between constitutional
rights and countervailing interests, and allows countervailing interests
to prevail so long as they rise to the level of a “compelling government
interest.” 53 Before Congress passes legislation that regulates a
constitutional right that is judicially protected by strict scrutiny,
Congress ought to assess whether it believes the interest behind the
legislation is sufficiently important to qualify as a compelling
governmental interest. Resolving conflicts between constitutional rights
and countervailing interests by ensuring that the countervailing interest
is compelling belongs to the domain of post-production constitutional
decision-making.
Second, constitutional rights can sometimes come into conflict
with one another. Consider the circumstance of a gay couple that asks a
baker with religious objections to create their wedding cake. This is
plausibly described as presenting a conflict between the gay couple’s
equality rights and the baker’s religious freedom or speech. 54 Resolving

See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003).
Any regulation also must be narrowly tailored to achieving the compelling interest, of
course. Congress’s judgment as to the means it adopts also belongs to the constitutional
domain. See infra notes 142–47 and accompanying text.
54 I fully endorse the statement above in the text, though it might appear inconsistent with
legal doctrine in two respects. First, on account of The Civil Rights Cases, it might be thought
that constitutional rights cannot be implicated insofar as no state law governs the couple and
baker, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Second, on account of Employment Division v. Smith’s rejection of
strict scrutiny for most free exercise claims, 485. U.S. 660 (1988), it might be thought that
religious freedom could not be at issue. Though this Article is not the place to fully respond to
these concerns, three points are worth making. Two are in response to the first concern: (1)
state action unquestionably is present in states that have anti-discrimination law that protects
either the baker or the couple; and, more controversially, (2) insofar as citizenship rights can
impose obligations on citizens, see Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense-Reference
Distinction, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 555, 600, 606–08 (2006) (quoting Senator Wilson’s and
Sherman’s understandings of citizenship rights), it follows that citizens’ acts can undermine
other citizens’ constitutional rights. As to the second concern, (3) the full scope of a
constitutional right is not equivalent to what is judicially enforceable, see generally Lawrence
Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 1212 (1978), and Smith’s holding is best understood as being tied to limits on judicial
enforceability. More generally, the second and third points account for the legislature’s role in
the subdomain of constitutional decision-making that this Article calls the Adequate
Realization of Constitutional Rights. (I do not mean to suggest that the legislature has the
exclusive role in this subdomain. Courts, executives, and states also have crucial roles to play).
52
53
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conflicts between constitutional rights is an activity that belongs to postproduction constitutional decision-making.
II. NORMS
A.

What They Are, and How They Arise

Because the Special Norms are norms, it is necessary to clarify what
norms are. A norm is a “behavioral standard that individuals feel
obligated to follow,” and that generally is followed. 55 Norms are an
important mechanism for coordinating behavior. 56 Those coordination
benefits can serve as an incentive for norm-creation.
Norms are distinct from law. A norm can be generated by law or
incorporated into law. 57 But norms also exist outside of law. They can
arise without formal adoption or formal enforcement and may even be
contrary to positive law. 58 I shall refer to a norm that is not incorporated
into positive law as a Bare Norm. A norm’s existence depends upon
substantial compliance but does not require perfect compliance. 59 And
norms may be applicable to only a subset of the population.
It might be wondered why people would restrict themselves by
complying with norms that have been neither formally adopted nor are
formally enforced. But the fact that people do so is the uniformly
55 Though I quote here from Richard McAdams, my substantive definition diverges
somewhat from his. See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338; SOCIAL NORMS, NONLEGAL SANCTIONS, AND THE LAW 101, 381
(Eric A. Posner ed., 1997) (“[B]y norm I mean a decentralized behavioral standard that
individuals feel obligated to follow, and generally do follow . . . [to gain the esteem of others], or
because the obligation is internalized, or both.”). My usage closely tracks Allan Gibbard’s and
Scott Shapiro’s. See ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGS: A THEORY OF NORMATIVE
JUDGMENT 70 (1992) (defining norm as “a formulation of a pattern which, in effect, controls the
organism’s behavior” that can be formulated as a prescription or imperative by a sophisticated
observer of the behavior); SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 41 (2013) (defining norm as “any
standard—general, individualized, or particularized—that is supposed to guide conduct and
serve as a basis for evaluation or criticism.”).
56 See GIBBARD, supra note 55, at 26–27; SHAPIRO, supra note 55, at 41.
57 Norms thus may be formally adopted and/or formally enforced or otherwise
institutionalized.
58 See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 55, at 41.
59 See GIBBARD, supra note 55, at 73–80.
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accepted understanding of the norms literature and is unquestionably
true. 60 It is natural to ask how norms, particularly those that are neither
formally adopted nor enforced, get their grip on people such that they
guide behavior.
The norms literature identifies two mechanisms that generate
norms: internalization and acceptance. Internalization is a biological
adaptation for coordination 61 that occurs as people mimic, often
unwittingly, patterns of behavior exhibited by others. 62 The mechanism
of acceptance, by contrast, depends upon language and intentionality.
Language allows for “shared evaluation” of not only the immediate
situation, but also “past, future, and hypothetical situations.” 63 Through
language, people “[w]ork[] out in a community what to do, what to
think, and how to feel in [hypothetical] situations,” and in so doing
come to accept norms that are to govern that situation. 64 Acceptance is
not a unanimity requirement; it is enough that the norm be widely
accepted by a group, and that it be widely known that the norm is
widely accepted. 65 The normative discussion through which a
community converges on a norm need not deeply engage every
individual. People “tend[] to be influenced by the avowals of others,” 66
and the emerging consensus of key players may bring others along.
Despite the complicated realities of life that people sometimes
insincerely avow norms and that behavior does not always track even
sincerely avowed norms, 67 norms exist and substantially guide behavior
much of the time.
B.

Application to the Special Norms Thesis

We now are in a position to understand the Special Norms Thesis
and the burdens it bears. This Article aims to generate an account of
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

See generally sources cited supra note 55.
See GIBBARD, supra note 55, at 70–71.
See id. at 70.
Id. at 72.
Id.
See id. at 76 n.18.
Id. at 75.
See id. at 73–80.
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norms that properly apply to members of Congress when they engage in
constitutional decision-making. It does not claim that our
representatives already have internalized such norms, but instead argues
that they should accept these norms. This Article hopes to persuade
readers that these norms should be accepted and hopes that this insight
carries over to Congress.
The Article does not claim that the Special Norms can be tied to
any formal legal texts, 68 that Special Norms are implied by the
Constitution, or that they are constitutional conventions. 69 Indeed, the
Special Norms would not be presently binding on Congress to the
extent that they have not been widely accepted and are not generally
complied with. 70 But, as is true of norms generally, the Special Norms
could arise in the future outside of formal lawmaking mechanisms, and
could then become binding on members of Congress.
There are several mechanisms by which the norms might be
adopted by Congress. The question of whether there should be Special
Norms might become a subject of normative discussion of Congress at
large, or of an influential subset of its members. Or the conclusion that
such norms exist may become so entrenched in society that our
representatives internalize the conclusion. Precisely how such norms
come to be accepted is important but is not this Article’s subject. This
Article instead focuses on the antecedent question of whether there
ought to be such norms and, if so, what their contents should be.
Regardless of what transfer mechanism may be deployed, it must
be acknowledged that considerable work must be done at the start by
those who hope to propagate a new norm. A skeptic might grab this
concession, point to the many self-serving people who populate
Congress and to today’s hyper-partisan political climate, 71 and declare

68 With one exception: the norm of Proactivity sometimes may be of constitutional status.
See infra Section IV.A.
69 See supra note 20.
70 I take no position here on the empirical question of to what extent Congress presently
acts consistently with the Special Norms Thesis.
71 See, e.g., Carroll Doherty, Key Takeaways on Americans’ Growing Partisan Divide Over
Political Values, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/10/
05/takeaways-on-americans-growing-partisan-divide-over-political-values [https://perma.cc/
R4Z9-N265]; The Partisan Divide on Political Values Grows Even Wider, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 5,
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the Special Norms Thesis a politically naïve, hopeless pipe dream—
essentially a self-defeating proposal. 72
This is unduly cynical. Successfully generating congressional
norms is not dependent on the unrealistic assumption that members of
Congress are self-sacrificing angels. For example, if Special Norms
become strongly entrenched in the public’s expectations, members of
Congress may be inclined to act in accordance with them, if only to
receive public acclamation and shore up their legacy. Alternatively,
some influential members may come to understand the need for the
Special Norms and convince sufficient numbers of their colleagues of
such need, or at least of the wisdom of acting in accordance with them.
Regardless of how acceptance of the Special Norms were to begin,
sustaining them would require far less work, and correspondingly
require far less in the way of self-sacrifice than is necessary to initially
entrench them. It is not unusual for norms to be self-sustainingly
internalized after their acceptance. So, while the case for the Special
Norms is challenging, and strongly dependent upon norm
entrepreneurs at its start, this does not mean the Special Norms are a
pipe dream.
C.

Judicial Temperament, Reflective Equilibrium, and Norm
Generation

The role-specific norms that this Article champions are less
mysterious than might appear at first. Indeed, role-specific norms can
be found elsewhere in American government. Consider the behavioral
standards applicable to judges, known as judicial temperament. 73 The
primary source of the judicial temperament requirement is not formal
legal materials, but expectations that have been developed and taken
root over time. Further, the role-specific norm of judicial temperament

2017), https://www.people-press.org/2017/10/05/the-partisan-divide-on-political-values-growseven-wider [https://perma.cc/92WH-FPMW].
72 See Adrian Vermeule, Self-Defeating Proposals: Ackerman on Emergency Powers, 75
FORDHAM L. REV 631, 636–40 (2006).
73 See generally Terry A. Maroney, (What We Talk About When We Talk About) Judicial
Temperament (January 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2018/01/Paper-Maroney.pdf [https://perma.cc/X24T-QK26].
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was not generated only by judges, but was developed with the assistance
of other government officials (especially those who appoint judges),
scholars, and the public. To this day, judicial temperament requirements
are not primarily grounded in formal legal texts, 74 and are not primarily
enforced through litigation or impeachment. Judicial temperament is
primarily enforced on the front-end by those who select judges, and by
judges themselves insofar as they have accepted and internalized the
norm.
The norm of judicial temperament has another informative feature.
As entrenched as it is, the contents of the norm of judicial temperament
remain substantially unclear to this day. 75 Yet judicial temperament has
been able to shape expectations and behavior throughout the long era
during which its requirements have been substantially unspecified.
But how could judicial temperament have “serve[d] as a shared
standard of conduct and justification” 76 if its contents have been so
unspecified? To begin, people may “share a clear enough idea of what
the non-normative conditions are that fulfill those conditions in most
cases.” 77 In other words, people know what falls outside the bounds of
judicial temperament when they see it, even if they cannot articulate a
clear principle that fully describes problematic judicial behavior. The “I
know-it-when-I-see-it” character does not undermine the importance of
the abstract category of judicial temperament. To the contrary,
consensus as to the abstract category’s existence grounds the normative
conclusion that specific actions inconsistent with judicial temperament
are wrongful.
Far from being a liability, judicial temperament’s longstanding lack
of specification may have been a necessary stage before its contents were
understood. Fleshing out judicial temperament’s contents is an exercise
in normative thinking, and much normative thinking occurs through
74 The most complete formulation is found in a series of standards promulgated by the
American Bar Association. See id. at 2 n.8 (citing AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDING COMMITTEE
ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS 3 (2009)).
75 See generally id.; Lawrence B. Solum, A Tournament of Virtue, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1365
(2005); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT: THE PERSONALITIES AND RIVALRIES THAT
DEFINED AMERICA 6–7 (2007) (“Elusive as it is important, judicial temperament is notoriously
hard to define.”).
76 T.M. SCANLON, BEING REALISTIC ABOUT REASONS 118 (2014).
77 Id.
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the process that John Rawls famously dubbed the reflective
equilibrium. 78 Tom Scanlon helpfully explains that process: “One begins
by identifying a set of considered judgments, of any level of generality,
about the subject in question. These are judgments that seem clearly to
be correct and seem so under conditions that are conducive to making
good judgments of the relevant kind about this subject matter.” 79 These
considered judgments correspond to the behaviors that were initially
understood to be required by judicial temperament. Reflective
equilibrium’s next step is to “formulate general principles that would
‘account for’ these judgments.” 80 This second step corresponds to the
effort to articulate a more general, abstract statement of what judicial
temperament requires. Arriving at a satisfactory general formulation
typically is not immediately “successful,” and divergences between
principles and considered judgments are remedied by some
combination of abandoning a particular considered judgment and
modifying the principle. 81 Indeed, “working back and forth between
principles and judgments” may not lead to a final resting point, but may
“continue[] indefinitely.” 82
But why should “the fact that a judgment is among our judgments
in such an equilibrium mean that we are justified in accepting that
judgment?” 83 The mere fact of consistency between specific judgments
and a principle cannot justify either the judgments or the principle,
because consistency can be attained by mindlessly discarding an
inconsistent judgment or mindlessly reworking the justifying
principle. 84 The justificatory force of an equilibrium between judgments
and principle “must lie in the details of how the equilibrium is
reached.” 85 In other words, it is “the process of pursuing reflective
See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 20 n.7 (1971).
SCANLON, supra note 76, at 76–77.
80 Id. at 77.
81 See id.
82 See id.
83 Id. at 79.
84 See id.
85 Id. Scanlon convincingly argues that those details extend beyond process, and beyond the
subjective “credence attached to these judgments by the person carrying out the process,” to
include “the credibility of the considered judgments . . . .” Id. 82. “Credibility” includes an
assessment of the considered judgment’s substantive plausibility. See id. at 82–84.
78
79
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equilibrium” that is critical to securing trustworthy conclusions as to
both considered judgments and principles. 86
This account of reflective equilibrium can help us understand how
even an unspecified concept of judicial temperament could have
performed substantial work in guiding expectations and behavior. Even
in its unspecified state, the concept would have put people on the alert
for paradigmatic instances of behaviors inconsistent with judicial
temperament. Scholars are now trying to generalize from these agreedupon clear instances (i.e., considered judgments) to generate more
abstract formulations (principles) that can account for the agreed-upon
judgments. 87 There likely will be a toggling back and forth between the
considered judgments and the principle as each is adjusted in the search
for a stable reflective equilibrium. Possibly an ongoing process rather
than a final resting state, this back-and-forth may be what permits the
generation of ever-deepening understandings of judicial temperament.
D.

Implications for the Special Norms Thesis

The example of judicial temperament is highly instructive to the
Special Norms Thesis. Judicial temperament is an example of
development of behavior-shaping role-specific norms outside the
formal mechanisms of law creation and enforcement, by some
combination of acceptance and internalization. The success of the norm
of judicial temperament suggests that other role-specific norms can also
be developed, such as the Special Norms.
The example of Judicial Temperament also shows that a norm can
have disciplining effects even while its contents are substantially
unspecified. In fact, not prematurely codifying a norm’s contents may
be critical to reflective equilibrium, the very process that enables the
norm’s contents to be progressively developed. Because the notion that
Special Norms govern constitutional decision-making has not yet been
widely recognized or followed in practice, it would be unwise for any
institution to immediately codify them. Better to allow the incremental
process of reflective equilibrium to run its course, which is best

86
87

Id. at 84.
See sources cited supra note 75.

Rosen.40.6.7 (Do Not Delete)

2019]

7/15/2019 4:45 PM

SPECIAL NORMS THESIS

2793

accomplished by not formalizing the Special Norms as a matter of
positive law at this point. Instead, after making members of Congress
generally aware that Special Norms should govern their constitutional
decision-making, Congress should be left to work out the Special
Norms’ contents through reflective equilibrium’s iterative toggling back
and forth between—and while modifying—shared considered
judgments and more abstract articulations of the governing norms.
While Parts IV and V of this Article provide a substantial first-cut at
identifying the Special Norms’ contents, they are only intended as a
preliminary and provisional effort.
After some time, the Special Norms might become binding positive
law, either by Congress adopting them as its internal rules 88 or by their
becoming a constitutional convention. 89 Either way, courts should not
have power to enforce the Special Norms because they govern
Congress’s purely internal operation. More plausibly, Congress might
police compliance with the Special Norms at some future time.
III. WHY CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION-MAKING SHOULD BE
DISCIPLINED BY SPECIAL NORMS
Part III presents five arguments why constitutional decisionmaking in large diverse democracies should be governed by Special
Norms, not the thin norms applicable to non-constitutional decisionmaking. 90 After elaborating the five arguments in Sections A–E, Section
F clarifies the precise relationships among them and the maximal limits
of what the five arguments can establish.

88 For example, former Senator Russ Feingold proposed that the Senate adopt rules
requiring that members consider the constitutionality of their proposed actions. Russ Feingold,
The Obligation of Members of Congress to Consider Constitutionality While Deliberating and
Voting: The Deficiencies of House Rule XII and a Proposed Rule for the Senate, 67 VAND. L. REV.
837, 843, 850 (2014).
89 See Pozen, supra note 14, at 930 (“Constitutional conventions are unwritten norms of
government practice that are regularly followed out of a sense of obligation but are not directly
enforceable in court.”).
90 Most, though not all, of the arguments apply to all governmental institutions. The first
argument applies only to legislatures.
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The Argument from Considered Judgment (First Argument)
What the First Argument Requires, and What it is Capable of
Establishing

First, there is a substantial consensus—or there would be if people
thought about it—that Special Norms should apply to some of
Congress’s constitutional decisions. These Considered Judgments can
serve as starting points for developing, through the iterative process of
reflective equilibrium, the more abstract principles that justify and
determine the contents of the Special Norms. As such, the first
argument appeals to the reader’s sensibilities. Its claim is that if the
question were posed to the reader under favorable circumstances—
outside the heat of political battle, when the reader has time to calmly
consider the matter—it would be agreed that some of Congress’s
constitutional decisions should not be made under the gossamer-thin
norms that govern ordinary politics. Under what I will call the norms of
Hardball Politics that apply to ordinary politics, a member of Congress
may seek legislation that delivers benefits only to her preferred
constituencies, and nothing (or worse) to unsupportive voters. Or she
may oppose legislation only to politically harm the President or other
legislators. The Argument from Considered Judgment appeals to the
reader’s sensibilities to conclude that some of Congress’s constitutional
decisions should not be taken under the norms of Hardball Politics.
The Argument from Considered Judgment is a bare-bones
argument that can be established on the basis of only minimal
conditions. It does not demand a rationale that explains its conclusion,
only agreement as to the conclusion, because generating the principle
that explains the Considered Judgment occurs later in the reflective
equilibrium process. Likewise, the argument does not require that the
contents of the Special Norms be identified. Nor does it require clarity
as to the scope of the domain of constitutional decisions to which the
Special Norms apply. Furthermore, the Argument from Considered
Judgment acknowledges the possibility that one or more initial
Considered Judgment may be subject to refinement—even rejection—as
reflective equilibrium unfolds.
The first argument’s bare-bones quality is both a strength and
weakness. Its strength lies in the possibility for a streamlined argument
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shorn of the complexities of justifying the Special Norms and specifying
their contents—details that may be impossible to specify early on. 91 But
the first argument’s weakness is that it cannot be definitive. This is
because while the first argument relies on the intuitions that give rise to
Considered Judgments, the argument acknowledges the possibility that
reflective equilibrium may show that some initial Considered Judgments
were erroneous. This is why the Special Norms Thesis does not rest only
on the first argument.
a.

The First Argument

The first argument is established by showing a Considered
Judgment that some of Congress’s constitutional decisions should not
be taken under the norms of Hardball Politics. Consider Part I’s
examples of Congress’s constitutional decision-making. If people were
asked under conditions conducive to making good judgments, I submit
it would be agreed that none of those decisions should be rendered
under Hardball Politics. For example, senators should not refuse to
confirm the President’s nominees for officers for the purpose of
undermining his presidency. It would be wrongful for Democrats to
initiate impeachment for the purpose of damaging a Republican
president or the Republican party. And it would be wrongful for
congressional Republicans to refuse to impeach an impeachmentworthy Republican president to avoid damaging their party or preserve
their political majority.
While the first argument is largely speculative by its very nature,
there is some evidence to back it. Consider the popular responses to the
divergent approaches to the conflict between equality and religious
freedom that were taken by the Indiana and Utah legislatures. 92 There
was unitary Republican control in both states. Republicans in Indiana’s
legislature flexed their political muscle in classic Hardball Politics
fashion, taking no input from the LGBT community and making no

91 Reflective equilibrium presupposes the impossibility of specifying from the get-go the
principles that justify initial Considered Judgments. See supra notes 76–86 and accompanying
text.
92 Though these examples come from state legislatures, their lessons fully carry over to
Congress.
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apparent effort to accommodate them. 93 Utah, by contrast, enacted
legislation only after there had been a years-long dialogue between the
religious and LGBT communities. In marked contrast to the Indiana
law, Utah’s legislation contained compromises that benefitted all
constituents: The legislation simultaneously guarded religious liberty
and granted substantial anti-discrimination protections to the LGBT
community. 94
What occurred in Utah substantially tracks what is called for by the
Special Norms. 95 But all that need be established for purposes of the first
argument is that Utah’s Republican supermajority relied on something
other than Hardball Politics, and that this has been widely perceived as a
good thing. Whereas Indiana’s legislation ignited a national firestorm in
protest that led Indiana to quickly amend its statute, 96 Utah’s legislation
93 See Dwight Adams, RFRA: Why the ‘Religious Freedom Law’ Signed by Mike Pence Was So
Controversial, INDY STAR (Apr. 25, 2018 11:30AM), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/
2018/04/25/rfra-indiana-why-law-signed-mike-pence-so-controversial/546411002
[https://
perma.cc/9EM3-3B5E]. For more examples in other contexts that track Indiana’s approach, see
Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in
Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2585–89 (2015) (noting that statutes granting broad
conscience-based exemptions in the context of reproductive services typically have not included
provisions that guarantee women access through other means).
94 See Harry Bruinius, Utah LGBT Antidiscrimination Law Could Chart New Path for
Compromise, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 12, 2015), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/
Politics/2015/0312/Utah-LGBT-antidiscrimination-law-could-chart-new-path-for-compromise
[https://perma.cc/FYQ7-XLES] (reporting that Utah voted overwhelmingly to add sexual
orientation and gender identity to the state’s existing anti-discrimination laws in housing and
employment); Niraj Chokshi, Gay Rights, Religious Rights and a Compromise in an Unlikely
Place: Utah, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/gay-rightsreligious-rights-and-a-compromise-in-an-unlikely-place-utah/2015/04/12/39278b12-ded811e4-a500-1c5bb1d8ff6a_story.html [https://perma.cc/U2GN-7HXB] (reporting that the Utah
legislation was preceded by six years of face-to-face dialogue between the Mormon Church and
Utah’s LGBT community).
95 See infra notes 186, 202–16 and accompanying text.
96 Major companies, sports and entertainment figures, and national personalities harshly
criticized Indiana, and legions threatened to boycott the state. See Michael Muskal & Matt
Pearce, Arkansas, Indiana Governors Sign Amended Religious Freedom Laws, L.A. TIMES (Apr.
2, 2015, 4:30 PM), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-indiana-religous-freedom-law-revise20150402-story.html [https://perma.cc/F8RY-BRKS]; Danielle Paquette & Sandhya
Somashekhar, After National Outcry, Indiana GOP Amends Religious Freedom Law, WASH.
POST (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/indiana-gop-moves-to-addlgbt-protections-to-religious-freedom-law/2015/04/02/b43a7796-d96b-11e4-8103fa84725dbf9d_story.html?utm_term=.a9eac22dacbf [https://perma.cc/TY76-S888] (noting that
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received nationwide praise from across the political spectrum. 97 This is
evidence of a Considered Judgment that something other than Hardball
Politics should be used to legislatively resolve conflicts between equality
and religious freedom.
B.

The Argument from Exclusion (Second Argument)

Because the Special Norms Thesis claims that Special Norms
operate in the constitutional domain, there are two main alternatives to
it. 98 Each alternative collapses the distinction between the constitutional
and non-constitutional domains. The first, what might be called the
High Equivalence Thesis, maintains that the “special” norms operative in
the constitutional domain properly apply to ordinary politics as well.
The second alternative, the Low Equivalence Thesis, claims that the same
“non-special” norms that govern ordinary politics also operate in the
constitutional domain. Disproving these two contenders—what I jointly
refer to as the Equivalence Theses—would indirectly prove the Special
Norms Thesis.99 Sections III.B–III.E develop this indirect Argument
from Exclusion for the Special Norms Thesis.
1.

The High Equivalence Thesis

Indiana’s law “drew heavy fire not only from gay rights activists but also from a wide range of
large companies, including Apple, Levi’s, the Gap, Angie’s List, Eli Lilly, Twitter and Yelp”);
Eric Bradner, NCAA ‘Concerned’ Over Indiana Law That Allows Biz to Reject Gays, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2015/03/25/politics/mike-pence-religious-freedom-bill-gay-rights
[https://perma.cc/RJF3-Q8EE] (last updated Mar. 26, 2015, 3:04PM); Richard Lugar, William
H. Hudnut, Stephen Goldsmith, Bart Peterson & Greg Ballard, Fallout from RFRA Very
Concerning to Indianapolis Mayors, INDY STAR. https://www.indystar.com/story/opinion/
readers/2015/03/31/fallout-rfra-concerning/70744904 [https://perma.cc/S2H2-K2YM] (last
updated Mar. 31, 2015, 8:09 PM).
97 See Chokshi, supra note 94. This is not to suggest there have not been any dissenting
voices. See, e.g., Ryan Anderson, How to Think About Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
(SOGI) Policies and Religious Freedom 2–5 (Heritage Found., Paper No. 3194, 2017), https://
www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-03/BG3194.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SNR-HQEA].
98 For a third possibility, see infra Section V.C.
99 Though the Argument from Exclusion cannot on its own definitively prove the Special
Norms Thesis, it helps make the case for it. See infra notes 149–52 and accompanying text.
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The High Equivalence Thesis posits that the same “special” norms
that operate in the constitutional realm properly apply to the entire
domain of public decision-making. The most carefully made case for the
High Equivalence Thesis can be found in the deliberative democracy
literature. Deliberative democracy’s most important American scholars,
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, identify extensive “conditions of
deliberation” that they claim apply to the “normal processes of
democratic politics.” 100 Because Gutmann and Thompson believe these
requirements operate across all public decision-making, 101 deliberative
democracy is a species of the High Equivalence Thesis.
Deliberative democracy has been subject to sharp criticisms, 102
three of which carry over to the High Equivalence Thesis. First, critics
argue that deliberative democracy fundamentally misconstrues the
domain of politics. The critics argue that politics is “not merely
adversarial but [is] inherently and permanently conflictual” because it
concerns the allocation of the costs and benefits of living collectively. 103
100 AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 7 (1996)
[hereinafter GUTMANN & THOMPSON, DISAGREEMENT]; see AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS
THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? (2004) [hereinafter GUTMANN & THOMPSON,
WHY?]. Levitsky and Ziblatt likewise propound a form of the High Equivalence Thesis insofar
as they argue that norms of institutional forbearance apply to all of Congress’ decision-making.
See LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 9, at 125–26. But because almost all the examples they
invoke to make their case belong to the constitutional domain, see id. at 118–43 (discussing the
Senate’s refusal to appoint any presidential nominees, court-packing, excessive pardoning, and
impeachment), their argument establishes a proposition closer to the Special Norms Thesis
than the High Equivalence Thesis. Insofar as Levitsky and Ziblatt believe their conclusions
apply to the entire domain of politics, they may fall prey to the fallacy of composition. See
generally Hans Hansen, Fallacies, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N.
Zalta ed., 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fallacies [https://perma.cc/3RXN-W234]
(noting that the fallacy of composition occurs when the “properties of parts . . . are mistakenly
thought to be transferable” to the composite).
101 Though Gutmann and Thompson think “not all issues, all the time, require deliberation,”
GUTMANN & THOMPSON, WHY?, supra note 100, at 3, they think that deliberative requirements
apply to far more than the constitutional domain, see, e.g., GUTMANN & THOMPSON,
DISAGREEMENT, supra note 100, at 354 (explaining that deliberative requirements applied to the
EPA’s decision of whether to close a copper smelting plant); GUTMANN & THOMPSON, WHY?,
supra note 100, at 17–18 (applying deliberative requirements to determining how a state should
allocate its health care resources).
102 See, e.g., DELIBERATIVE POLITICS: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (Stephen
Macedo ed., 1999).
103 Michael Walzer, Deliberation, and What Else?, in DELIBERATIVE POLITICS, supra note
102, at 58, 66–67 (emphasis added).
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Politics’ allocative decisions are crucially important because they
substantially determine people’s material welfare and power, yet they
are not susceptible to a determinate calculus that can generate
objectively correct answers. 104 Consider, for example, how bankruptcy
costs are divided among competing creditors. Many details concerning
this cost-allocation decision are zero-sum games; for example, someone
must absorb the costs of allowing the bankrupt to have a second chance,
and everyone wants that to be the someone else who does not absorb the
cost. Lacking objective criteria for dividing the spoils and costs of social
living, politics invariably will be “the endless return to these
disagreements and conflicts, the struggle to manage and contain them,
and, at the same time, to win whatever temporary victories are
available.” 105 On this view of what the domain of politics consists of,
deliberation is largely inapposite to resolving political controversies. 106
Instead, “[t]he democratic way to win is to educate, organize, [and]
mobilize . . . more people than the other side has. ‘More’ is what makes
the victory legitimate, and . . . the victory is rarely won by making good
arguments.” 107 Deliberative democracy’s requirements are inapt to
decision-making of this sort, as are the Special Norms.
A second criticism is that deliberative democracy does not
adequately respect citizens and their preferences. Deliberative
democracy harbors a not-so-secret ambition that deliberation will alter
citizens’ views. 108 Other conceptions of democracy, by contrast, posit
that governmental policies should be “made on the basis of nothing

104 See id. (arguing that “[p]ermanent settlements are rare in political life precisely because
we have no way of reaching anything like a verdict on contested issues”).
105 Id. (“Political history . . . is mostly the story of the slow creation or consolidation of
hierarchies of wealth and power. People fight their way to the top of these hierarchies and then
contrive as best they can to maintain their position.”); see also Ian Shapiro, Enough of
Deliberation: Politics is About Interests and Power, in DELIBERATIVE POLITICS, supra note 102,
at 28, 29 (arguing that “disagreements in politics are shaped by differences of interest and
power”).
106 See Walzer, supra note 103, at 67 (arguing there is no “way to avoid the endless repetition
of this story, any way to replace the struggles it involves with a deliberative process”).
107 Id. at 66.
108 Deliberative democracy’s hope that citizens’ views will be modified through deliberation
is implicit in its criticism of “aggregative conceptions” of democracy on the ground that “they
do not provide any process by which citizens’ views about [society’s] distributions might be
changed.” GUTMANN & THOMPSON, WHY?, supra note 100, at 16.
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other than the views of individuals” as they are. 109 Though the second
criticism can stand even if the first criticism’s conception of politics is
rejected, the second criticism is fortified insofar as the first criticism is
correct. For if politics is fundamentally a forum for self-interest and
power struggle, then deliberative democracy’s aspiration of changing
citizens’ views looks suspiciously like governmental overreach aimed at
instilling a false consciousness in some citizens so as to achieve social
stability.
A third criticism is that deliberative democracy is too impractical
in the demands it makes of citizens and representatives. Decisionmaking in modern legislative chambers and administrative agencies
looks nothing like the conditions of deliberation prescribed by
deliberative democracy. Nor could it. The vast governmental
bureaucracies that operate across our country create far too much law,
and make too many enforcement decisions, for deliberative democracy’s
conditions to be met.
These three criticisms of deliberative democracy—that it
misconceives of the domain of politics, inadequately respects citizens’
preferences, and makes unrealistic demands—are powerful objections to
the High Equivalence Thesis. As explained below, none of these
critiques carry over to the Special Norms Thesis. But before doing so, it
will prove useful to examine another alternative to the Special Norms
Thesis that also avoids these critiques: the Low Equivalence Thesis.
2.

The Low Equivalence Thesis

109 JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 147 (1999). While Gutmann and
Thompson treat Waldron as an exemplary aggregative democrat, see GUTMANN & THOMPSON,
WHY?, supra note 100, at 14 & 191 n.16, even Waldron “hopes” that individuals’ “views will be
informed . . . by discussion among the members,” WALDRON, supra, at 147. But Waldron
ultimately thinks “a decision among options proposed by the members is to be made by the
members with reference to nothing other than the views of the members,” even if views have not
been informed by discussion. Id. at 147–48 (emphasis added); see also Frederick Schauer,
Talking as a Decision Procedure, in DELIBERATIVE POLITICS, supra note 102, at 17, 20
(distinguishing deliberative democracy from a decision procedure in which “deliberation might
precede” a vote, but where “the preferences of citizens, however those preferences might be
formed, are taken as dispositive”).

Rosen.40.6.7 (Do Not Delete)

2019]

7/15/2019 4:45 PM

SPECIAL NORMS THESIS

2801

Accepting the above three criticisms readily leads to a view of
politics that is quite consistent with present day practice. If politics is the
domain for determining how to allocate the benefits and costs of social
living, and there is no “view from nowhere” from which objectively
correct decisions can be made, then the familiar stuff of democratic
politics 110 seems to be the appropriate way to make political decisions.
Apart from only modest restrictions (such as on bribery), the Low
Equivalence Thesis claims that legislators may engage in the hardest of
Hardball Politics when engaging in public decision-making.
The Argument from Considered Judgment111 presents a challenge
to the Low Equivalence Thesis insofar as it identifies a domain of public
decisions that should not be decided under the norms of Hardball
Politics. Yet those Considered Judgments are only provisional, as they
are subject to confirmation or rejection as justificatory principles are
identified through reflective equilibrium. A sturdier response to the Low
Equivalence Thesis accordingly requires more abstract justifications for
the conclusion that Hardball Politics does not appropriately govern the
entire domain of public decision-making.
The Article now identifies three profound weaknesses of the Low
Equivalence Thesis. First, as explained immediately below in this
Subsection, permitting Hardball Politics in the constitutional domain
cannot satisfactorily legitimate governmental power. Second, as
explained in Section III.D, Hardball Politics in constitutional matters
cannot establish the type of political fraternity that modern
constitutional democracies aspire to create. Third, as explained in
Section III.E, Hardball Politics is inappropriate for those constitutional
decisions that account for the core of a country’s political identity.
a.

Legitimacy Deficit

The Low Equivalence Thesis is plagued by two types of legitimacy
deficits. First is a deficit in the type of legitimacy that concerns political

110 For an excellent description, see Walzer, supra note 103, at 59–66 (identifying
political
education through indoctrination “so that each indoctrinated member becomes an agent of
doctrinal transmission,” organization, mobilization, demonstration, statement, and debate for
the purpose of victory, bargaining, lobbying, campaigning, voting, and fund-raising).
111 See supra Section III.A.
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theorists, namely the government’s moral right to exercise political
power. 112 I shall call this philosophical legitimacy.
Philosophical legitimacy “is a weaker notion than justice.”113
“Political power may be legitimately exercised in ways that are unjust,
unfair, or otherwise unjustifiable.” 114 But while legitimacy is weaker
than justice, satisfying legitimacy is no easy matter. The easiest way to
appreciate why is to consider the perspective of a political minority that
is usually, or always, on the losing side of political skirmishes. Why is it
morally right for the government’s laws to require them to do
something they do not want to do? Establishing the conditions that
satisfy philosophical legitimacy has been a preoccupation of Western
political theory, which has long sought to explain why the state can
justifiably compel individuals against their will, and the limits of that
power. 115
For example, Locke predicated the legitimacy of the state’s coercive
powers on citizen consent. 116 Rousseau claimed the state never really
forces citizens to do something they do not want to do because the state
can only legislate the “general will,” which consists only of those wants
that each citizen shares with other citizens. 117 In effect, Locke and

112 See, e.g., Simon Căbulea May, Religious Democracy and the Liberal Principle of
Legitimacy, 37 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 136, 137–38 (2009). What I call philosophical legitimacy
corresponds to Richard Fallon’s category of “moral legitimacy.” See Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1792, 1796–1801 (2005).
113 May, supra note 112, at 148.
114 Simon Căbulea May, Democratic Legitimacy, Legal Expressivism, and Religious
Establishment, 15 CRITICAL REV. INT’L SOC. & POL. PHIL. 219, 220 (2012) (citing JOHN RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM 427–28 (2005)).
115 See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 1, 58–61 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett
Publ’g Co. 1978) (1859) (discussing “the nature and limits of the power which can be
legitimately exercised by society over the individual,” which for Mill includes both state power
and nonlegal customs); RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 114, at 217 (“[W]e ask: when
may citizens by their vote properly exercise their coercive political power over one another
when fundamental questions are at stake?”); Waldron, supra note 16, at 1387.
116 See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION 158 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1689–90).
117 See DAVID M. ESTLUND, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK 103
(2008) (explaining Rousseau’s “general will” as being “whatever is common to the wills of all
citizens”); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 75–77 (Maurice Cranston trans.,
Penguin Books 1968) (1762) (arguing that the state’s legitimate powers extend only to
“authentic act[s] of the general will,” meaning “the common good” or “the common interest.”).
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Rousseau legitimate governmental power through denial, as both their
theories presuppose that, properly understood, the state does not
compel citizens against their will. But both solutions rest on
counterfactual assumptions so far from reality that virtually nobody
today accepts them. 118 As for Locke, it cannot be credibly suggested that
each of our nation’s citizens has given actual or even tacit consent to the
government(s) to which they are subject. 119 And as for Rousseau, it
cannot be plausibly claimed that the state only legislates what each
citizen already wills on her own. 120 Nor do people appear to be prepared
to conclude that any legislation beyond the overlap of citizens’ wills is
illegitimate. For purposes of legitimating state power, the simplifying
assumptions on which Locke’s and Rousseau’s theories rely are
problematic.
To this day, there is no universally accepted answer to what
philosophically legitimates governmental power. 121 Probably the most
influential family of contemporary approaches premises legitimacy on a
variation of Locke, proposing that the terms of social cooperation must
be decided by a decision-making procedure as to which people could
plausibly be said to hypothetically consent. 122 This can be thought of as a
two-stage solution to philosophical legitimacy, insofar as it distinguishes
between the procedures for generating laws, as to which there must be
hypothetical consent, and the substantive laws themselves, as to which
there need not be hypothetical consent. 123 The Low Equivalence Thesis

118 The fact that a theory simplifies reality itself is not a fatal defect, for virtually all do. See
generally KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, AS IF: IDEALIZATION AND IDEALS (2017). But while a
theory’s simplifications may make it useful for some purposes, the theory may not be helpful
for others. See id. at 17–27. The critiques above in text accordingly are not tantamount to
claiming that Locke’s and Rousseau’s theoretical constructs should be rejected.
119 See Fallon, supra note 112, at 1797 n.30 (noting that modern “theorists generally reject
this basis for political obligation); RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:
THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 11–31 (2004).
120 See, e.g., WALDRON, LEGISLATION, supra note 109, at 115–16.
121 See Fallon, supra note 112, at 1796–1801.
122 See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 114 (using the original position to
determine what political structure reasonable persons hypothetically would consent to); see
generally Cynthia A. Stark, Hypothetical Consent and Justification, 97 J. PHIL. 313, 313–14 n.1
(2000).
123 See Waldron, supra note 16, at 1386–87 (offering a “process-based” theory of political
legitimacy).
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is inconsistent with this family of approaches to legitimating state
power, because it allows a political majority to select any decisionmaking procedure it wants, enabling it to unilaterally set the terms of
the polity’s political relationships. Political minorities surely would not
consent to this, in actuality or hypothetically.
In fact, the Low Equivalence Thesis is consistent with only the
sliver of contemporary approaches to philosophical legitimacy that
Professor Richard Fallon helpfully characterizes as “minimal” theories
of legitimacy. 124 Minimal theories “typically begin with the premise that
decent human lives would be impossible without a government,” and
from there conclude that “the need for effective government generates a
moral duty to support any reasonably just legal regime . . . .” 125 Because
minimal theorists understand this “reasonably just” caveat to be easily
satisfied, 126 minimal theories come close to legitimating governmental
power simply on an inhabitant’s failure to exit. Professor Fallon’s
terminology is quite accurate: This, indeed, counts as only a minimal
theory of legitimacy. 127 In fact, it is so minimal as to not qualify as
sufficient for most western political theorists, present and past. 128 For
those who think the minimal theories to be inadequate, and who are
committed to the western political tradition’s longstanding effort to
robustly legitimate governmental power, the Low Equivalence Thesis’s
legitimacy deficit should count as a powerful objection.
As if this were not enough, there is a second type of legitimacy
deficit that plagues the Low Equivalence Thesis. Distinct from
philosophical legitimacy is the question of whether a polity is legitimate

See Fallon, supra note 112 at 1798.
Id. Fallon adds a caveat to this moral duty of “absent [there being] a fair prospect of its
swift and relatively nonviolent replacement by more just institutions.” Id. The most prominent
of these theorists is Joseph Raz. See id. at 1835.
126 See, e.g., id. at 1798 n.33 (quoting David Copp, The Idea of a Legitimate State, 28 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 3, 43–44 (1999) (“Matters would have to be very bad for a state not to be
legitimate . . . .”)).
127 Fallon ultimately defends the U.S. Constitution as being “only minimally morally
legitimate . . . .” Id. at 1803.
128 See id. at 1797 n.30 (citing George Klosko, Reformist Consent and Political Obligation, 39
POL. STUD. 676, 677–78 (1991) (noting that most political theorists reject the proposition that
mere residence implies consent)).
124
125
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as a sociological matter, 129 meaning that “the relevant public regards it
as justified, appropriate, or otherwise deserving of support for reasons
beyond fear of sanctions or mere hope for personal reward.”130
Sociological legitimacy is an empirical fact, and can exist even if the
demands of philosophical legitimacy are not, or cannot be, met. 131 I now
venture into the precarious world of untested empirical claims to
suggest that constitutional decisions rendered under Hardball Politics
are particularly vulnerable to being viewed as sociologically illegitimate.
I suspect that the demand for sociological legitimacy plays a lot of work
in generating the Considered Judgments concerning Special Norms. For
example, I speculate that impeaching the president under Hardball
Politics would not be viewed by the public as justified, appropriate, or
otherwise deserving of support. While the tax code has sociological
legitimacy despite its unmistakable marks of Hardball Politics, a
Hardball Politics-driven impeachment of a president would not.
3.

The Special Norms Thesis

The previous two Subsections identified substantial deficiencies in
each of the Equivalence Theses. The next three Sections show that the
Special Norms Thesis is not vulnerable to these critiques, thereby
providing the final piece to the Argument from Exclusion. And there is
more: each of the distinctions that separates the Special Norms Thesis
from the Equivalence Theses is sufficiently important to count as a
standalone argument for the Special Norms Thesis. 132
C.

The Argument from Legitimacy (Third Argument)

129 This analysis relies on Professor Fallon’s distinction between moral and sociological
legitimacy. See id. at 1795–1801.
130 Id. at 1795–96.
131 See id. at 1795.
132 Because each is independent of the Argument from Exclusion, any one of them can
establish the Special Norms Thesis even if the Argument from Exclusion were to fail.

Rosen.40.6.7 (Do Not Delete)

2806

7/15/2019 4:45 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:2769

The Special Norms Thesis does not suffer from the Low
Equivalence Thesis’s legitimacy deficit. 133 The Special Norms Thesis
allows for more-than-minimal philosophical legitimacy because it
proposes that Special Norms apply to the constitutional domain, which
includes the polity’s law-making procedures. Likewise, the Special
Norms can play a critical role in establishing and maintaining
government’s sociological legitimacy. 134
The Special Norms Thesis’s capacities to more-than-minimally
legitimate government and to satisfy sociological legitimacy are
sufficiently important to qualify as a standalone argument for the
Special Norms Thesis. Call it the Argument from Legitimacy. Legitimacy
of governmental authority, both philosophically and sociologically, is
crucial insofar as modern democracies are predicated on respect for
individuals and equality of citizenship. Legitimacy of governmental
power is deeply tied to both.
D.

The Argument from Political Fraternity (Fourth Argument)

Having explained why the Special Norms Thesis is not susceptible
to the legitimacy critique leveled against the Low Equivalence Thesis, let
us now see why it also is immune to the High Equivalence Thesis’s three
vulnerabilities. The first criticism was that Deliberative Democracy
misconstrues the nature of the political domain. 135 Because politics
determines how the costs and benefits of social life are allocated,
deliberation is inapt to address the enduring conflicts that are rooted in
individuals’ competing self-interests. 136 But the constitutional domain is
different. It aims to establish, and provides the infrastructure for
creating, a political fraternity by setting the basic political relations
among citizens, and between citizens and their governments. The nature
of a polity’s political fraternity is distinct from the decisions allocating
133 Though Deliberative Democracy also aspires to create a government that satisfies morethan-minimal legitimacy, it suffers other deficiencies from which the Special Norms Thesis is
immune. See infra Sections III.D, III.E.
134 Below I explain how Tempered Politics’ sub-norms of Reciprocity and Communicative
Exchange support sociological legitimacy. See infra Section IV.C.
135 See supra notes 102–07 and accompanying text.
136 See id.
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the benefits and costs of social life that are the subject of ordinary
politics. While deliberation-driven consensus may be inapposite to
ordinary politics, it is fitting for purposes of deciding upon the nature of
a polity’s political fraternity. Deliberative Democracy’s merging of these
distinctive domains makes it vulnerable to the first critique, whereas the
Special Norms Thesis’s sensitivity to the domains’ distinctiveness
immunizes it.
The second critique was that Deliberative Democracy inadequately
respects citizens insofar as it does not accept them as they are, but tries
to reshape their views. 137 That critique does not carry over to
constitutionalism because one of the aims of constitutional decisionmaking is to identify, and if possible expand over time, the matters as to
which consensus can be reached so as to secure an enduring political
union. While liberal modern democracies must respect individual
autonomy even in the constitutional domain, this is not inconsistent
with the constitutional domain being the realm where citizens together
aim to establish an enduring consensus as to the framework that will
operationalize their political relations.
The third critique was that Deliberative Democracy is too
demanding and unrealistic in its expectations. But this criticism carries
less force in relation to the Special Norms Thesis, which posits that
Special Norms apply to only a sub-domain of public decision-making.
And to the extent the third critique relies on the wide divergence
between deliberative democracy’s demands and the actual practice of
politics, the third critique has far less force vis-à-vis the Special Norms
Thesis. This is so insofar as there is evidence that Congress has engaged
in self-consciously responsible decision-making akin to what is
demanded by the Special Norms when it has recognized that it was
engaging in constitutional decision-making. 138 And so have other actors
who participate in constitutional decision-making. 139
These reasons why the Special Norms Thesis is immune to the
three critiques against the High Equivalence Thesis constitute an

See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.
See supra note 23.
139 Professor Ackerman claims that citizen’ engagement during “constitutional moments”
diverges from their behavior during ordinary politics. See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS,
supra note 4, at 287–88.
137
138
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additional standalone argument for the Special Norms Thesis that might
be called the Argument from Political Fraternity. Special Norms are
appropriate because a modern democracy’s constitutional domain aims
to establish a political fraternity of a certain type. Permitting the
numerical majority to select the rules that determine citizens’ political
relations via Hardball Politics would both reflect and create political
relations that are inconsistent with what is appropriate in a modern
democracy. 140 Permitting the majority to select the terms of political
engagement under Hardball Politics would not treat all members of the
polity with the respect that is owed to free and equal citizens. 141
The Argument from Political Fraternity plays triple duty. Beyond
(1) immunizing the Special Norms Thesis from the three critiques of the
High Equivalence Thesis and (2) constituting an affirmative standalone
argument for the Special Norms Thesis, the Argument from Political
Fraternity also (3) provides a second reason (independent of its
legitimacy deficit) for rejecting the Low Equivalence Thesis.
E.

The Argument from Identity (Fifth Argument)

The Argument from Identity also plays triple duty: it distinguishes
the Special Norms Thesis from both Equivalence Theses while also
serving as a standalone argument for the Special Norms Thesis. The
Argument primarily applies to the part of the constitutional domain
that has the effect of reflecting, and constructing, the polity’s core
political identity. The Argument from Identity asserts that in a liberal
democracy, decisions determining a polity’s core identity are properly
taken pursuant to Special Norms, not the norms of Hardball Politics.
The Argument from Identity depends upon an appreciation of how
constitutional rights operate in modern democracies. As a descriptive
matter, each constitutional right (R1) may be restricted for the purpose
140 The Argument from Political Fraternity is related to, but independent of, the Argument
from Legitimacy. As to their similarity, liberal democracies must satisfy legitimacy. But the two
arguments are independent in two respects. First, legitimacy may not be a sufficient condition
to establish the type of political fraternity to which a particular liberal democracy aspires.
Second, even if no polity can satisfy legitimacy, the Argument from Political Fraternity may still
be valid.
141 This formulation draws on John Rawls’s influential approach. See generally RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 114, at xviii, 9.
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of achieving sufficiently important countervailing purposes. 142 The
sufficiently important purpose that allows a right-restriction may be a
countervailing constitutional right (R2), or a sub-constitutional interest
(I). The allowance of rights-restrictions means that rights are not
absolute. R1’s non-absoluteness reflects the conclusion that there exist
societal goals of sufficient importance (R2 and I) such that it would be a
mistake to allow R1 to automatically and always prevail. 143
Because constitutional rights are non-absolute, resolving conflicts
among competing societal commitments is a component of postproduction constitutional decision-making. These competing
commitments are almost always incommensurable because no single
metric fully captures each commitment’s normatively relevant
contents. 144 A polity’s decision as to how it resolves such conflicts is
both identity-reflecting and identity-defining. 145
To illustrate, while both the United States and German
constitutions protect speech, the two countries’ constitutional
jurisprudence are markedly different. Germany allows competing
constitutional and sub-constitutional principles to justify speech
restrictions far more frequently than does the United States. For
example, Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court upheld a substantial
damages award against a satirical magazine for having referred to a
paraplegic reserve officer as a “cripple.” 146 The outcome under United
States jurisprudence would almost certainly be different.
More generally, though the constitutions of today’s liberal
democracies embrace virtually the same set of constitutional rights, the
characters of the polities they establish are not the same. The differences
are substantially attributable to the distinctive ways each polity
See Rosen, Non-Absolute Constitutional Rights, supra note 51, at 1545–53, 1558, 1573–96.
See id.
144 See Mark D. Rosen, Two Ways of Conceptualizing the Relationship Between Equality and
Religious Freedom, 4 J.L., RELIGION & STATE 117, 123–26, 139–40 (2016); Rosen, Non-Absolute
Constitutional Rights, supra note 51, at 1585–87, 1600.
145 See Joseph Raz, Incommensurability and Agency, in INCOMMENSURABILITY,
INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 110, 110–28 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997) (arguing that
choice, not rationality, governs the selection among incommensurables); Charles Taylor,
Leading a Life, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra,
at 170, 170–83 (arguing that justified choice among incomparables can be made by analyzing
how the competing goods fit within the “shape” of a person’s life).
146 Rosen, Non-Absolute Constitutional Rights, supra note 51, at 1587.
142
143
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accommodates the competing constitutional and sub-constitutional
interests that they all accept as valid. How each polity resolves conflicts
among these incommensurable commitments both reflects and helps
constitute each polity’s core political identity.
Once the identity-reflecting and identity-constructing character of
this aspect of post-production constitutional decision-making is
recognized, the Argument from Identity is quite straightforward.
Decisions determining a polity’s core identity are properly taken
pursuant to Special Norms in a constitutional democracy, not the norms
of Hardball Politics. Insofar as the polity’s core identity should come
from the people, rather than being forced upon it by a mere political
majority, Hardball Politics is inapt to post-production decision-making
that resolves constitutional conflicts because such resolutions reflect and
constitute the polity’s core political identity.
The Argument from Identity fortifies the Argument from
Exclusion in two respects. The first is straightforward: It provides yet
another reason, independent of the Arguments from Legitimacy and
Political Fraternity, for rejecting the Low Equivalence Thesis. Second,
the Argument from Identity is another reason why the Special Norms
Thesis is immune to the three critiques against the High Equivalence
Thesis. This requires clarification. The three critiques presuppose that
Deliberative Democracy misconstrues the nature of the political
domain, naïvely believing politics to be a locus for consensus when it
instead is a domain of the perpetually and inherently conflictual. 147 The
Argument from Identity insists that some (at the least) constitutional
decision-making is different from politics’ domain of perpetual
conflicts. Though conflicts are not absent from the constitutional
domain, the subject of dispute is not the allocative question of what I as
an individual get, but the identity question of who we as a collective are.
While stable consensual resolutions may be neither realistic nor
conceptually appropriate for ordinary politics’ allocative questions, the
same cannot be said about a democracy’s questions as to core political
identity. As to that, consensus is conceptually and pragmatically the
proper aspiration. It follows that the sub-domain of public decisionmaking that reflects and constructs the polity’s core identity may

147

See supra notes 102–07 and accompanying text.
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appropriately be disciplined by different norms than those that govern
ordinary politics.
F.

What the Five Arguments Do and Do Not Establish

Having fully stated the five arguments for the Special Norms
Thesis, it is time to clarify the relationship among them and explain the
limits of what they establish.
The Argument from Considered Judgment addresses only a
handful of specific constitutional decisions—not all of Congress’s
constitutional decision-making. Because the first argument is
fundamentally intuition-based, its conclusions are provisional and
cannot extend beyond the examples themselves. 148 The subsequent four
arguments provide theoretical grounding for the first argument, thereby
strengthening it. The subsequent four arguments also expand the
domain to which the Special Norms apply, from a handful of
Considered Judgments to the entirety of Congress’s constitutional
decision-making.
The Argument from Exclusion aims to disqualify both of the
Special Norms Thesis’s contenders by identifying devastating critiques
as to which the Special Norms Thesis is immune. But the Argument
from Exclusion cannot be sufficient on its own to definitively establish
the Special Norms Thesis, because identifying deficiencies in the
Equivalence Theses cannot establish that the Special Norms Thesis is
deficiency-free, or even that it has fewer deficiencies than its
competitors. This explains why the Special Norms Thesis cannot be
established solely by negative argumentation directed against its
alternatives. The Special Norms Thesis itself must be analyzed, which
necessarily includes an accounting not only of its benefits but its costs as
well.
But the fact that an affirmative argument ultimately must be made
for the Special Norms Thesis does not mean the Argument from
Exclusion is unimportant. By identifying the finite options among
which a choice must be made, the Argument from Exclusion prevents

148 Unargued extension to all constitutional decision-making would run afoul of the fallacy
of composition. See supra note 100.
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myopic preoccupation with the Special Norms Thesis’s costs. In essence,
the Argument from Exclusion helps us identify the Special Norms
Thesis’s appropriate burden of persuasion. The relevant question is
what option is best, all things considered, not whether the Special
Norms Thesis is perfect and cost-free. 149 Of course it is not—few things
(if any) in life or politics are.
The Arguments from Legitimacy, Political Fraternity, and Identity
identified the Special Norms Thesis’s promised benefits. 150 But we have
not yet considered the Thesis’s costs. This Article’s next two Parts
identify those costs as they work out the Special Norms’ contents (Part
IV) and explain the Special Norms’ operation in difficult cases (Part V).
Part VI’s final accounting of the Special Norms Thesis’s projected
benefits and costs is the predicate for the Article’s all-things-considered
conclusion in favor of the Special Norms Thesis. 151
IV. CONTENTS OF THE SPECIAL NORMS APPLICABLE TO CONGRESS
This Part provides a preliminary specification of the contents of the
Special Norms that should apply to Congress’s constitutional decisionmaking. While Part III’s arguments for the Special Norms Thesis
substantially carry over to all other branches and levels of
government, 152 this Part’s analysis is tailored to only one institution:
Congress.
149 This observation echoes the fundamental insight of comparative institutional analysis.
See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3–5 (1994).
150 While neither the Argument from Considered Judgment nor the Argument from
Exclusion depends on Hardball Politics’ norms being gossamer-thin, each Argument’s force
admittedly is reduced the more demanding the norms of Hardball Politics are. The Arguments
from Legitimacy, Political Fraternity, and Identity, however, are unaffected by any plausible
description of the norms that govern ordinary politics.
151 Having fully explained how this Article’s argument operates, it is now possible to identify
the difference between it and Pozen’s argument regarding constitutional bad faith. Whereas
this Article relies on arguments specific to the constitutional domain, Pozen relies on the fact
that bad faith is prominent in other legal fields yet largely absent in constitutional case law. See
Pozen, supra note 14, at 886–88, 909–18. The two articles’ arguments are non-duplicative,
though complementary.
152 Substantially, though not entirely. The Argument from Considered Judgment only
considered examples of congressional constitutional decision-making, see supra Part III, and
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Before proceeding, it is important to emphasize that what follows is
only a preliminary effort at specifying the Special Norms. Neither
Congress nor scholars have yet devoted attention to the question of
what norms should govern when Congress engages in constitutional
decision-making. 153 The impossibility of definitively specifying the
Special Norms’ contents before Congress has recognized their need,
much less tried to flesh them out, is an artifact of reflective equilibrium’s
role in normative reasoning. 154 With these caveats, I proceed to explore
three Special Norms that should discipline Congress’ constitutional
decision-making.
A.

The Norm of Proactivity

Congress ordinarily has complete discretion in setting its agenda.
But appreciation of the domain of constitutional decision-making
indicates the need for a norm that sometimes imposes a proactive duty
on Congress to act. Consider the sub-domain of Protecting
Constitutional Institutions. 155 Threats to a state’s republican form of
government generate a duty on Congress to act so as to guarantee its
republican form of government. This duty is an example of the
Proactivity Norm in action. Consider, as well, the sub-domain of
Enabling Constitutional Institution: 156 Congress’s failure to make timely
appointments of executive officers and federal judges would run afoul of
the Proactivity Norm. As another example, Congress’s failure to declare
war when U.S. troops engage in sustained hostile combat may prompt

the Argument from Political Fraternity might operate differently in relation to the federal and
state governments, see infra note 183.
153 See Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker, supra note 14, at 82, 102 (identifying
the proper constitutional decision-making for Congress as consisting primarily in “interpreting
the text, original history, and structure of the Constitution, as well as precedents and social and
moral values that bear on constitutional questions,” and advocating changes that “would make
the [congressional] committees look and act more like courts”).
154 See supra Section II.C.
155 See supra Section I.B.2.
156 See supra Section I.B.1.
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the President to step into the void and take initiatives that properly
belong to Congress, 157 leading to the presidency’s over-enablement.
The Proactivity Norm should not require that Congress always be
the front-runner. For example, it is sensible to allow courts to be the
first-responders in creating the choice-of-law rules that help constitute
our system of horizontal federalism. 158 Likewise, the Constitution itself
gives States the presumptive power to fashion the rules that
operationalize our republican system’s elections. 159 But if other
governmental institutions ignore risks to constitutional structures, or
fumble in their attempts to address such risks, the Proactivity Norm
imposes a duty on Congress to act.
Unlike the other Special Norms, the Proactivity Norm is not always
a Bare Norm. 160 When the whether question belongs to the
constitutional domain 161 and circumstances dictate an affirmative
answer, the Proactivity Norm incorporates a constitutional duty. This is
true of the Guarantee Clause question discussed two paragraphs above.
But the Proactivity Norm is broader than the set of proactive
constitutional duties. 162 Finally, the absence of a Proactivity-imposed
duty to act does not imply that Congress should not act. Apart from
instances where it demands congressional action, the Proactivity Norm
does not displace Congress’s ordinary discretionary authority to set its
own agenda.
B.

The Norm of Explicitness

The Norm of Explicitness determines when Congress must openly
take account of constitutional considerations, thereby triggering
application of the soon-to-be-discussed Special Norm of Tempered
157 See generally Mark D. Rosen, From Exclusivity to Concurrence, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1051,
1116–21 (2010) (discussing the phenomenon of “breach-stepping”).
158 See Rosen, Choice-of-Law, supra note 34, at 1095–97.
159 See Rosen, Congress and Political Partisanship, supra note 45, at 277–78 (discussing the
Time, Place, and Manner Clause).
160 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
161 Determining when the whether question belongs to the constitutional domain is a
substantive constitutional question. See, e.g., supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text
(discussing the Guarantee Clause).
162 See, e.g., Rosen, Marijuana, supra note 39, at 1039–40.
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Politics. To illustrate, if Congress considers choice-of-law legislation
under the Effects Clause, must Congress explicitly take account of the
fact that the bill belongs to the domain of constitutional decisionmaking insofar as it would build-out our system of horizontal
federalism?163 Or can Congress debate the bill in exclusively nonconstitutional terms, for example by only considering whether it would
reduce litigation costs?
Whether there should be a Norm of Explicitness that triggers an
obligation to explicitly consider constitutional ingredients in Congress’s
decision-making turns on three considerations. Because none of the
considerations is of constitutional pedigree, the Norm of Explicitness is
not positive law, but is a Bare Norm. 164
1.

Quality

The first consideration is how a Norm of Explicitness would affect
the quality of constitutional decision-making. The answer depends
upon the epistemological question of how knowledge in the domain of
constitutionalism is best developed. This consideration favors
Explicitness. The quality consideration would count against Explicitness
only on a pure intuitionist view that sound constitutional judgments are
only made intuitively and are impeded by self-aware rational
consideration. I am unaware of any sustained arguments on behalf of a
pure intuitionist view of constitutional reasoning, and nothing
recommends it.
2.

Institutional Capacity for Responsible Constitutional DecisionMaking

The second factor bearing on the Norm of Explicitness is
Congress’s institutional capacity for making quality constitutional
decisions. Though many have expressed strong skepticism, 165
See supra Section I.B.2.
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
165 See, e.g., Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?,
61 N.C. L. REV. 587, 610 (1983) (“Congress, however, has not been a model of constitutional
163
164
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concluding that Congress is incapable of responsible constitutional
decision-making would be premature for two reasons. First,
institutional competence only can be assessed in relation to a clear
understanding of the tasks an institution must discharge. And we
presently lack that. Most everyone who has considered the question has
asked whether Congress can competently interpret the Constitution. 166
But as Part I showed, most of Congress’s constitutional decision-making
does not consist in the hermeneutic process of interpreting
constitutional text. 167 Because there is not yet an adequate account of the
extra-hermeneutic components of Congress’s constitutional decisionmaking, declaring Congress incapable of responsible constitutional
decision-making would be premature. And such a conclusion would be
self-defeatist, given the many constitutional decisions Congress
invariably must make when exercising its powers and discharging its
responsibilities. 168
This Article spotlights a second reason why it would be premature
to declare Congress institutionally incapable of constitutional decisionmaking. We presently lack an account of the norms that should govern
Congress’s constitutional decision-making. If responsible decisionmaking depends on these yet-to-be determined norms, concluding that

decisionmaking . . . . Its hallmark has been superficial and, for the most part, self-serving
constitutional debate.”); id. at 609 (“Both institutionally and politically, Congress is designed to
pass over the constitutional questions, leaving the hard decisions to the courts.”).
166 See, e.g., Brest, Conscientious Legislator, supra note 14, at 589, 601; David P. Currie,
Prolegomena for a Sampler: Extrajudicial Interpretation of the Constitution, 1789–1861, in
CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 18, 20, 22 (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds., 2005);
Mark Tushnet, Is Congress Capable of Conscientious, Responsible Constitutional Interpretation?:
Some Notes on Congressional Capacity to Interpret the Constitution, 89 B.U. L. REV. 499 (2009);
Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1335 (2001).
167 As regards Resolving Conflicts, determining what interests are sufficiently important to
justify a right-infringement does not depend upon the hermeneutic activity of interpreting
constitutional text. See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text. Likewise, answering the
whether and what questions regarding the enabling, building-out, and protection of
constitutional institutions typically does not rely in substantial measure on the interpretation of
constitutional text. See supra notes 29–44 and accompanying text; see also Mark Greenberg, The
Moral Impact Theory of Law, 123 YALE L.J. 1288, 1302, 1328 n.100 (2014) (noting that the
“activity of working out the content of the law” is not coterminous with either linguistic or
communicative content, and hence is “not a genuinely hermeneutic enterprise”).
168 See supra Part I.
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Congress is incapable of responsible constitutional decision-making
would mistakenly confuse what is for what must be. 169
3.

Institutional Demands

Even if Explicitness would increase the quality of constitutional
decision-making (as seems likely), and if Congress were institutionally
capable of responsible constitutional decision-making (as is possible,
and as to which a negative conclusion should not yet be drawn), a Norm
of Explicitness still might be inappropriate for the specific institutional
context of legislatures. One concern is that a Norm of Explicitness
would interfere with the legislature’s capacity to function. For instance,
perhaps legislatures generally, or under certain conditions, can
successfully operate only when they make decisions on the basis of
incompletely theorized agreements. 170 Some may consider an
Explicitness Norm to be inconsistent with the legislature’s need to
obtain “local” agreements while avoiding deeper (viz., constitutional)
issues about which legislators may be hopelessly divided. An
Explicitness Norm may also risk amplifying conflict by heightening the
perceived stakes, impeding the legislature’s ability to get necessary
things done.
But there are countervailing considerations. First, because
“constitutional” is not synonymous with “detailed,” a requirement that
Congress explicitly address constitutional considerations is not
inconsistent with incompletely theorized agreements. Think back to
judicial temperament’s longstanding lack of specification. 171 Because
there was agreement as to the abstract proposition that judges should
display judicial temperament, but no consensus as to its details, judicial
temperament’s entailments were worked out over time on a case-by169 Though such norms sometimes organically grow from the process of doing, sometimes
they do not.
170 This reworks an idea of Cass Sunstein. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized
Agreements in Constitutional Law, 74 SOC. RES. 1 (2007). It also may be consistent with Rawls’s
“overlapping consensus,” which presupposes that people can “sign on to the policy from within
their differing points of view, and therefore on possibly very different grounds from each other”
without “converg[ing] on a policy . . . for the same reason.” AKEEL BILGRAMI, SECULARISM,
IDENTITY, AND ENCHANTMENT 8 (2014) (emphasis eliminated).
171 See supra notes 75–86 and accompanying text.
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case basis. Likewise, legislators can debate whether a specific action
comports with a constitutional requirement, without trying to articulate
a more abstract justification for the outcome or aiming to fill in all
details as to what would be constitutionally required in other
circumstances. 172
Second, an Explicitness requirement may not, on balance, hinder
congressional activity. This is because the Special Norms include subnorms that facilitate consensus and responsible decision-making. 173 We
must consider an Explicitness Norm’s net effects on congressional
activity, which are a function of all the Special Norms.
Third, even if an Explicitness Norm on balance made congressional
action more difficult in some cases, or even generally, it would have to
be asked whether the absence of an Explicitness Norm is normatively
and pragmatically preferable. Because the absence of an Explicitness
Norm would permit Congress to overlook constitutional considerations,
a categorical answer of “yes” seems doubtful.
In short, whether there should be an Explicitness Norm for
Congress’s constitutional decision-making turns on multiple empirical
and normative considerations. Yet some preliminary conclusions can be
drawn. To begin, it seems unlikely, and at the very least would be
premature to conclude, that there should never be an Explicitness
requirement. Likewise, it seems unlikely, and at the very least would be
premature to conclude, that there is a categorical Explicitness
requirement. Instead there should be a non-categorical Explicitness
Norm, whose precise scope could be refined by Congress over time
through the process of reflective equilibrium. 174 On account of
Explicitness’ epistemological benefits, Explicitness should be presumed,
though defeasible upon a showing that Congress is incapable of
responsibly rendering a specific constitutional decision, or that
Explicitness is inconsistent with some specific institutional need or
responsibility of Congress. Where the presumption of Explicitness is
overridden, the other Special Norms would be inapplicable. The correct

172 Narrowly deciding constitutional questions is in tension with Holism, a sub-norm of the
Special Norm of Tempered Politics. For a discussion, see infra notes 191–97 and accompanying
text.
173 See infra Section IV.C (detailing the contents of the Norm of Tempered Politics).
174 See supra notes 77–86 and accompanying text.
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specification of the Norm of Explicitness can eliminate the Special
Norms Thesis’s risk of bogging-down the legislative process.
An adequate showing of defeasibility should generate a narrow
context-limited exception to the Explicitness Norm, not a broad
conclusion against the existence of any Explicitness Norm, unless and
until a substantial pattern of defeasibility were to emerge. Defeasibility
arguments should be made to Congress itself, not courts, because the
Explicitness Norm (like the other Special Norms) is best generated and
enforced by Congress. 175 Finally, the Norm of Explicitness should apply
whenever Congress must make a decision belonging to the
constitutional domain, whether on account of the Norm of Proactivity
or because Congress discretionarily embarks on an activity whose may
or what questions belong to the constitutional domain, and for that
reason calls for constitutional decision-making.
Some examples may prove useful. 176 First, consider a representative
who holds an idiosyncratic, off-the-wall constitutional view. The Norm
of Explicitness should not require that she raise her constitutional
argument because premature articulation in Congress carries
epistemological and pragmatic risks. For example, a constitutional
argument’s move from off-the-wall to on-the-wall may require that
foundations for the argument first be laid outside of Congress. 177 If so,
this would be a reason why the Norm of Explicitness should not be
triggered vis-à-vis the idiosyncratic representative.
Next, imagine that a representative decides to assert an off-the-wall
constitutional argument. This should not trigger the Norm of
Explicitness vis-à-vis the rest of Congress. Only a sufficient
constitutional argument does. That criterion might take account of the
degree to which a representative’s even good faith constitutional
argument falls outside of a contemporary constitutional consensus,
meaning that constitutional arguments that are sufficiently off-the-wall
would not trigger the Norm of Explicitness. 178 Other relevant

175 As to the risk of Congress’s bad faith application of the Norm of Explicitness, see infra
note 280 and accompanying text.
176 For others, see infra notes 264–65 and accompanying text.
177 See BALKIN, supra note 31, at 294.
178 For a discussion of the risk that individual representatives might try to invoke the Special
Norms in bad faith, see infra notes 279–81 and accompanying text.
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considerations might include the number and degree of political
diversity of the representatives who support a constitutional argument,
the length of time they have advocated the position, the argument’s
reception outside of Congress, and whether the position has ever
enjoyed endorsement in the past, even if only by a few judges or
scholars. To be clear, these suggestions are intended to be preliminary
and provisional. 179 Precise specification of the Norm of Explicitness
ultimately falls to Congress, and likely would only take shape over a
period of time. Such is the nature of the reflective equilibrium process
by which norms are developed. 180
C.

The Norm of Tempered Politics

Explicitness and Proactivity are gatekeepers that determine when
Congress must self-consciously engage in constitutional decisionmaking. The third norm, the Norm of Tempered Politics, consists of the
substantive guidelines and constraints that apply to Congress’s
constitutional decision-making. Before diving into its details, a
macroscopic overview will be useful. Tempered Politics is a subset of
politics: constitutional decision-making does not belong to the domain
of pure logic or science but is part of the give-and-take by which a
democratic community selects the rules that govern its political
relations. There are three main ways such rules can be chosen: brute
force of the majority imposing its preference, one group persuading the
other, or compromise among groups. 181 Persuasion and compromise are
mechanisms for achieving consensus, unlike the brute force of pure
majoritarianism. Tempered Politics comprises sub-norms that jointly
and severally favor persuasion and compromise in the service of
consensus. And where consensus is not possible, Tempered Politics
demands decision-making that is more responsible, more civic-minded,
and more public-good oriented than the self-regarding Hardball Politics
179 See supra notes 77–86 and accompanying text (explaining the reflective equilibrium
process).
180 See supra notes 76–90 and accompanying text.
181 Cf. SEANNA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY, AND THE
LAW 56–60 (2014) (distinguishing brute force from jointly negotiated solutions, albeit in the
very different context of a robber and her victim).
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that is permissible during ordinary politics. 182 All in all, Tempered
Politics aims to structure Congress’s constitutional decision-making in a
manner that is designed to generate constitution-worthy decisions.
Tempered Politics’ details are a function of the character of the
polity that the political community has constructed and aims to further
develop. Tempered Politics has two component sub-norms in large
heterogeneous democratic polities: 183 Reciprocity and Communicative
Exchange. After specifying the contents of Reciprocity in Subsection 1
and Communicative Exchange in Subsection 2, Subsection 3 provides
justifications for both sub-norms. Because these justifications are not
grounded in constitutional text or tradition, Tempered Politics is
another Bare Norm. 184
1.

Reciprocity

Tempered Politics’ first sub-norm, Reciprocity, is a self-disciplining
constraint on the substantive positions each side is permitted to stake
out in the constitutional domain. 185 Reciprocity demands that members

182 For similar positions, see Brest, Conscientious Legislator, supra note 14, at 599 (“As the
interests affected by legislation become more important and the classifications more invidious,
the parochialism, self-interest, logrolling, and the like, that pervade the political process must
yield to generally shared principles of fair treatment.”); ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note
4, at 273, 287 (constitutional moments are characterized when citizens seriously consider the
“best interests of the United States” and “serious reflection on the country’s future”).
183 I take no position as to whether these requirements should apply to small homogeneous
democracies. Likewise, these requirements may not apply to state legislatures when they
undertake state constitutional decision-making. The Special Norms’ details depend upon the
type of political fraternity a polity aims to establish, see infra Sections IV.C.2, IV.C.3.a, and
there conceivably could be differences in this regard between the national and state political
communities, see generally Mark D. Rosen, The Outer Limits of Community Self-Governance in
Residential Associations, Municipalities, and Indian Country: A Liberal Theory, 84 VA. L. REV.
1053 (1998) (explaining that liberal political theory conceivably could justify divergent
constitutional limitations on the federal and sub-federal governments on account of the fact
that the national citizenry is heterogeneous whereas sub-federal polities might be culturally
homogeneous).
184 See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text (explaining what a Bare Norm is).
185 Here I draw upon, but modify, John Rawls’s “criterion of reciprocity.” See John Rawls,
The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in THE LAW OF PEOPLES 129, 136–37 (1999). Reciprocity
figures prominently in the deliberative democracy literature. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON,
DISAGREEMENT, supra note 100, at 52–94.
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of Congress only take positions they “think it at least reasonable for
others to accept . . . as free and equal citizens, and not as dominated or
manipulated, or under the pressure of an inferior political or social
position.” 186 Reciprocity applies only to the constitutional components
of Congress’s decision-making, not to any non-constitutional
ingredients that inform Congress’s ultimate decision.
As the next two Subsections explain, Reciprocity requires two
things of the constitutional decision-maker. First, she must make
imaginative leaps, putting herself into the shoes of her political
opponents and then imagining herself on the losing side of her proposal.
Second, the constitutional decision-maker must think holistically rather
than narrowly. When asking herself whether it is “at least reasonable” to
expect her opponent could accept her substantive constitutional
position, she must consider her position’s implications for related
contexts, not just the narrowest possible articulation of the question.
Reciprocity’s imaginative leaps and holistic reasoning in effect create a
consistency requirement, insofar as they require representatives to take
only positions that they would be willing to accept. 187
a.

Two Interpretive Leaps

186 Rawls, supra note 185, at 136–37. A reciprocity-like approach can be seen in a statement
from the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints concerning the Utah legislation that
addressed conflicts between religious conservatives and the LGBT community: “[i]n a society
which has starkly diverse views on what rights should be protected, the most sensible way to
move forward is for all parties to recognize the legitimate concerns of others . . . .” Bruinius,
supra note 94.
Reciprocity requires that a constitutional decision-maker reasonably think the other side
could accept her position, not that the other side in fact accepts it. Interpreting Reciprocity the
second way would transform it into a unanimity requirement, which would block too much
constitutional decision-making. A related question in Reciprocity’s specification is how
narrowly sliced one’s opponents should be. The more thinly sliced, such that there are more
opponent groups as to which Reciprocity’s “at least reasonable” requirement applies, the more
unworkable Reciprocity becomes, because as slices become narrower and more numerous,
Reciprocity in effect morphs into a unanimity requirement. Reciprocity must be properly
specified to avoid this difficulty. See Rosen, Marijuana, supra note 39, at 1041–52.
187 Reciprocity overlaps with Pozen’s bad faith constitutionalism insofar as both condemn
“inconsistent use of interpretive methodology.” Pozen, supra note 14, at 925. Reciprocity also
features prominently in the deliberative democracy scholarship. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON,
DISAGREEMENT, supra note 100, at 52–94; GUTMANN & THOMPSON, WHY?, supra note 100, at
98–110.
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Reciprocity requires one of two types of imaginative leaps on the
part of representatives when they engage in constitutional decisionmaking. Sometimes, representatives need only imagine themselves as
they are, though on the loser’s side of the proposal. For example,
Reciprocity demands that democrats proposing a partisan gerrymander
that would “waste” republican votes by packing a supermajority of
republican voters into a single district 188 think it “at least reasonable”
that democratic voters also should be stuffed into a single district. It
does not take much imagination to conclude that political gerrymanders
are inconsistent with Reciprocity. 189 Tempered Politics disallows parties
from taking positions that do not comply with Reciprocity during
constitutional decision-making.
But Reciprocity sometimes demands a second, more difficult,
imaginative leap. Sometimes representatives must imagine themselves
as if they were their political opponents. For example, in sorting out the
conflict between religious freedom and equality in the religious florist
controversy, 190 the gay couple must aim to put themselves in the place of
a person who held religious-based objections to same-sex marriage, and
the religious person must see herself as member of a gay couple. 191
Putting oneself in the position of one’s adversary is a precondition for
proposing positions that comply with Reciprocity, viz. positions a
representative might “think [as] at least reasonable for others to
accept . . . as free and equal citizens, and not as dominated or
manipulated, or under the pressure of an inferior political or social
position.” 192 While there is no magic formula for achieving this often
188 For a clear explanation of the techniques of partisan gerrymandering, see Nicholas O.
Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U.
CHI. L. REV. 831, 849–55 (2015).
189 For another example, consider voter registration laws designed to systematically
disenfranchise voters likely to vote for one party. See Michael Wines, Some Republicans
Acknowledge Leveraging State Voter ID Laws for Political Gain, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/17/us/some-republicans-acknowledge-leveraging-voter-idlaws-for-political-gain.html [https://perma.cc/AS7M-YNLS].
190 See, e.g., Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018).
191 This statement may part ways with Rawls’s idea of public reason insofar as Rawlsian
public reason, in the view of some at least, requires participants to disregard their religious
commitments. See generally CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE, RELIGIOUS CONVICTION IN LIBERAL
POLITICS (2002) (reciting and critiquing this understanding of public reason).
192 See Rawls, supra note 185, at 136–37.
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challenging second imaginative leap, ongoing respectful communication
with the opposition may be a helpful, if not indispensable, ingredient. 193
More generally, the second imaginative leap probably demands that
representatives expose themselves to others’ perspectives, which also can
be facilitated by consuming literature, films, and theater.
b.

Holism

In addition to its two imaginative leaps, Reciprocity requires that
decisionmakers think holistically about the larger social, political, and
legal context in which a dispute is situated, rather than focusing
narrowly on only an issue-by-issue basis. Holism’s preference for
situating constitutional disputes in a broader context serves multiple
purposes. First, it helps ensure internal consistency of each party’s
espoused constitutional position. To illustrate, so long as the federal
government in effect leaves the regulation of marijuana use to the states,
a prohibitory state that believed marijuana to be dangerous or addictive
might want to prohibit its citizens from using marijuana in a permissive
state. 194 Whether Congress can authorize such extraterritorial regulation
is a still unanswered constitutional question. 195 When a member of
Congress considers that question, holism demands that she consider the
related contexts where the constitutionality of state extraterritoriality
might arise (such as parental notification laws and concealed carry
laws). Her constitutional position as to marijuana must be consistent
with her views concerning state extraterritorial powers in those related
contexts. 196
Second, holism aims to deescalate constitutional conflict by helping
the parties take account of normatively relevant differences across
contexts that may justify varying constitutional outcomes. Holism
works against the tendency to elevate each and every constitutional
dispute into an Alamo that must be defended at all costs so as to avoid a
perceived cascade of constitutional implications.
193 See infra Section IV.C.2 (discussing Communicative Exchange). Utah’s successful
legislative solution to conflicts between religious liberty and equality was preceded by six years
of face-to-face dialogue between the Mormon Church and Utah’s LGBT community. See
generally Chokshi, supra note 94.
194 See Rosen, Marijuana, supra note 39, at 1014–15.
195 See id. at 1018–37.
196 See id. at 1042–52.
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Consider once again the controversy regarding florists with
religious objections to same-sex marriage. 197 It has been suggested that
accommodating florists’ religious objections would be tantamount to
endorsing the Jim Crow era shopkeepers’ refusal to serve African
Americans. 198 Holism cautions against too-quickly crediting this
analogy, and demands that disputants carefully consider the different
factual contexts in which each refusal of service is situated. Refusals-toserve during Jim Crow substantially impaired African Americans’ equal
citizenship rights insofar as such refusals were part of a systematic
practice of denying Blacks basic services and of otherwise marginalizing
them socially, politically, and economically. A florist’s refusal-of-service
may be less impairing of the same-sex couple’s citizenship rights if the
florist is on the social fringe, the couple can readily obtain services from
other providers, and society-at-large supports gay rights. 199
Holism invites inquiry as to whether there is a meaningful
difference between a refusal-of-service exercised by the majority as part
of a systematic regime of oppression, on the one hand, and a license to
refuse service that political victors beneficently extend to conscientious
objectors among the political losers, on the other. Holism insists that the
parties take account of the larger social context—a cluster analysis of
related circumstances, rather than a narrow issue-by-issue analysis—
See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Tim Cook, Tim Cook: Pro-Discrimination ‘Religious Freedom’ Laws Are
Dangerous, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/prodiscrimination-religious-freedom-laws-are-dangerous-to-america/2015/03/29/bdb4ce9e-d66d11e4-ba28-f2a685dc7f89_story.html [https://perma.cc/W5UH-HVE5] (equating refusal-ofservices to same-sex couples with the Jim Crow era).
199 I am not making an empirical claim that the conditions enumerated above in text have
been met. (Indeed, there would be substantial controversy in determining whether they were
met insofar as it would have to be decided what counted as the relevant geographic or political
unit for determining what counted as fringe and society-at-large). But the hypothesis forwarded
above stands notwithstanding these empirical challenges. That is to say, if and insofar as these
conditions are met, the race analogy is weakened, and it becomes more plausible to understand
the refusal-of-service as an accommodation to fellow members of our political community. And
even if white supremacists today stand on the social fringe, and if society-at-large condemns
racial discrimination, it would not follow that supremacists should be permitted to refuse
accommodation to African Americans. In contradistinction to today’s religious-objecting
florists, supremacists are no longer welcome members of the political community, and for that
reason are not owed the respect and accommodation that constitutionalism entails for
members of its political fraternity.
197
198
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when considering what positions they think it at least reasonable that
their political opponent, as a free and equal citizens, would accept. 200
Holistic analysis does not imply that the florist’s refusal imposes no
costs on the same-sex couple. But on account of the divergent social and
historical circumstances, the nature and costs of a refusal-of-service may
be quite different. Indeed, the holistic analysis demanded by Reciprocity
may on its own point to a satisfactory resolution of the florist
controversy.
2.

Communicative Exchange

Reciprocity is a substantial disciplining norm, but on its own it
cannot satisfy Tempered Politics. This is because even if the numerical
majority self-polices by conforming to Reciprocity’s demands, the
majority’s unilateral decision to adopt Reciprocity-compliant policies
still would be incompatible with what a modern constitutional
democracy demands. Though Reciprocity ensures the majority’s
position would be substantively fair, unilateral decision-making
nonetheless is a form of brute political force. A necessary component to
adequately legitimate the majority’s actions in the constitutional domain
is pre-enactment Communicative Exchange among the opposing sides
that allows for the possibility of consensual constitutional decisions that
are arrived at by some combination of mutual persuasion 201 and
compromise. 202
200 Holism is in tension with the narrow decision-making that is characteristic of
undertheorized agreements. See supra notes 170–72 and accompanying text. Precisely where
congressional decision-making should be located along the continuum of narrow to broad
decision-making depends on the issue. Narrow decision-making may facilitate consensus when
issues are fresh and the underlying considerations are least understood. But other times,
Holism’s call for broader decision-making may facilitate compromise, insofar as Holism
requires parties to identify for themselves, and then reveal to their opponents, their preferences
as to a cluster of related issues. This invites bargaining and tradeoffs, which may lead to
consensus compromises. The Special Norms Thesis leaves it to Congress to determine Holism’s
appropriate specification, a determination that is best made over time. See supra notes 76–89
and accompanying text.
201 Persuasiveness is a function of multiple factors, including a position’s substantive merits
and its proponent’s rhetorical skills and power. As to the latter, a legislator’s power partly owes
to what she can credibly threaten. Insofar as the Special Norms Thesis narrows the range of
credible threats that are available under current political practices, it is to be expected that the

Rosen.40.6.7 (Do Not Delete)

7/15/2019 4:45 PM

SPECIAL NORMS THESIS

2019]

2827

Tempered Politics’ sub-norm of Communicative Exchange
imposes interactive requirements on disputants. It demands
engagement with one’s opponents that is designed to “[w]ork[] out in
community what to do . . . .” 203 Communicative Exchange is not
monologuing, but consists of discussion and other interactions204 that
are deployed to achieve consensus. 205 Communicative Exchange
requires that participants be open to Mutual Influence, which has two
components. 206 Participants must aim not only to influence how others
think, but have genuine openness-to-being-influenced. The sub-norm
of Communicative Exchange also requires that all sides make a genuine
effort to achieve consensus through some combination of persuasion
and compromise. Communicative Exchange thereby provides political
minorities additional negotiation leverage beyond what they have in the
domain of ordinary politics. 207
a.

Openness-to-Being-Influenced

A requirement that interlocutors have genuine Openness-to-BeingInfluenced might be thought to unrealistically or unattractively
Special Norms Thesis will play a role in determining what counts as persuasive. For example, to
the extent that refusing to pass a yearly budget unconstitutionally disables governmental
institutions, Tempered Politics would eliminate the threat of shutting down the federal
government from a legislator’s toolbox of negotiation options. In this important respect, the
Special Norms Thesis has application to, and implications for, politicking in relation to nonconstitutional disputes.
202 Cf. Coral Davenport, A Climate Deal, 6 Fateful Years in the Making, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/14/world/europe/a-climate-deal-6-fateful-years-inthe-making.html [https://perma.cc/QQ9G-9YDY] (claiming that an important factor leading to
the Paris climate agreement among the 195 nations was that the French hosts of the convention
“made sure that each country, regardless of its size or wealth, felt its voice would be heard”).
203 See GIBBARD, supra note 55, at 72; ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 4, at 287
(constitutional moments characterized by “energetic exchange of public views” where each side
“address[es] each other’s critiques” and “talk[s] to one another” rather than “past one
another”).
204 Communicative Exchange is not limited to dialogue. Its contents turn on psychological
empirics, namely what activities facilitate the “mutual influence” discussed above in text. Art
and disruptive protest are examples of non-dialogic practices that likely belong to
Communicative Exchange. See generally ESTLUND, supra note 117, at 200–04.
205 See GIBBARD, supra note 55, at 73.
206 Id. (using the term “mutual influence”).
207 For a discussion of Tempered Politics’ distributive consequences and its normative
implications, see infra notes 242–46 and accompanying text.
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presuppose that participants are not deeply committed to their
positions. Not so. Openness-to-Being-Influenced is an artifact of what
is—and what is not—at stake in constitutional decision-making. What is
at stake are the basic rules that are to govern political relations in a large
heterogeneous democratic polity. What is not at stake is truth with a
capital “T.” 208 Openness-to-Being-Influenced does not require that
participants revisit or suspend the certainty they bring to their
normative commitments. It only requires that they be open to
reconsider what rules should govern citizens’ political relations, upon
better understanding their interlocutors’ perspectives.
While Openness-to-Being-Influenced favors accommodation and
compromise, it does not mean compromise always is appropriate. Some
people are outside the fold of the political community, and Opennessto-Being-Influenced makes no demands as to them. And there is a small
category of matters concerning which compromise would be
wrongful. 209 But Openness-to-Being-Influenced imposes prima facie
obligations of accommodation and compromise vis-à-vis fellow
members of one’s political community as to constitutional matters. Such
openness to the constitutional claims of others may be a sine qua non of
being part of a political community in a large and diverse constitutional
democracy.
b.

Aim-to-Influence

Next consider Mutual Influence’s requirement that an interlocutor
have an Aim-to-Influence her opponents to adopt her view. This might
seem both self-evident (of course an interlocutor will try to convince her
opponent!) and unhelpful (insofar as it does not demand tolerance of
the other side’s views). To the contrary on both accounts.
208 This argument owes a debt to Rawls’s distinction between political and comprehensive
views. See generally RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 114, at xv.
209 See AVISHAI MARGALIT, ON COMPROMISE AND ROTTEN COMPROMISES 54 (2010)
(defining rotten compromises, which must be categorically avoided, as any “agreement that
establishes or maintains an inhuman political order based on systematic cruelty and
humiliation as its permanent features”). I am not persuaded that Margalit’s definition exhausts
the category of rotten compromises. For example, might rotten compromise extend to
agreements that sustain political orders unwilling or unable to address human activities that
threaten global devastation? Margalit’s understanding of rotten compromise might, in other
words, be unduly human-centric, though this Article is not the place to consider this matter any
further.
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As against that, the criticism of Aim-to-Influence is self-evident:
the requirement counteracts the tendency to write off one’s political
opponents as “others” with whom one cannot have truck. The demand
that I genuinely engage, rather than ignore or preemptively dismiss, my
opponents is reflective of, and presupposes, a sharedness—a fraternity—
among interlocutors. 210 Thus, Aim-to-Influence is an artifact of the sort
of political fraternity that modern democratic societies aspire to
establish.
As against the criticism that Aim-to-Influence is unhelpful or
counterproductive, the demand that I genuinely engage my opponent
for the purpose of influencing her carries important implications. The
demanded exchange is not fundamentally confessional or
monological—it is not simply an opportunity to state what I believe and
why. Rather, the exchange must be directed at persuasion. 211 To be sure,
confession sometimes may assist persuasion, as when it enables my
opponent to understand why and how her views implicate my interests.
But persuasion also may require that I make arguments using my
opponent’s frameworks and vocabularies—deploying reasons that may
be persuasive to my opponent, though not necessarily to me on account
of my prior understandings and commitments. 212 Done the right way,
this form of argumentation is not dishonest. 213 It is another artifact of
sharing a political community with others, insofar as it reflects a faith

210 Cf. BILGRAMI, supra note 170, at 45–46 (arguing that serious engagement with others
with whom one is “in a moral dispute” by “refus[ing] to allow him his own truth” and
“striv[ing] to convince him of the truth as you see it and judge it, is to show the requisite
attitude of inclusiveness” and “brotherhood” toward him).
211 Accordingly, I disagree with Lynn Sanders’ critique of deliberation and call for
“testimony.” See Lynn M. Sanders, Against Deliberation, 25 POL. THEORY 347 (1997).
212 This is akin to Rawls’s notion of reasoning from conjecture and Bilgrami’s idea of
internal reasons. See generally Micah J. Schwartzman, The Ethics of Reasoning from Conjecture,
9 J. MORAL PHIL. 521 (2012); see also BILGRAMI, supra note 170, at 54–55 (discussing “internal”
reasons); Robb Willer & Matthew Feinberg, From Gulf to Bridge: When Do Moral Arguments
Facilitate Political Influence?, 41 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1665 (2015) (arguing
that political arguments reframed to appeal to the moral values of those holding the opposing
political position are typically more effective than arguments framed only to reflect one’s own
moral values).
213 This generally requires making clear that I myself do not accept all the premises with
which my argument works.
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that all sides share enough in common that each can reason in their
distinctive ways to the same conclusion. 214
It takes time, effort, and a degree of empathy to enter my
interlocutor’s conceptual universe so that I can effectively engage with
her on her own terms. 215 And Reciprocity places the same demands on
my interlocutor. Accordingly, Aim-to-Influence may help each side
come to a better understanding of, and perhaps even develop a
sympathy for, her political opponent and her positions. Communicative
Exchange thus may facilitate Reciprocity’s second imaginative leap of
seeing oneself as her political opponent. 216 And mutual sympathies that
may arise from Communicative Exchange may further incline
disputants towards the mutual accommodation and compromise that
can lead to consensus. 217
3.

Justifications for Reciprocity and Communicative Exchange

214 This shares much with Rawls’s conception of the overlapping consensus. See generally
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 114, at 164–68. And it contrasts with Habermas’s
view. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 166 (1996) (claiming that consensus “rests on reasons that
convince all the parties in the same way”).
215 See BILGRAMI, supra note 170, at 55–57 (noting that being able to make internal
arguments calls for “elaborately empathetic attitudes of engagement”); JONATHAN HAIDT, THE
RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION 57–58 (2013).
216 In this important respect, Communicative Exchange and Reciprocity are complementary.
217 Having elaborated the Special Norms’ contents, the differences between Pozen’s and my
conclusions should be easy to see. Pozen proposes that bad faith’s “core meanings . . . center on
dishonesty, disloyalty, and lack of fair dealing,” to which he adds the “Sartrean” notion of
“deception of self.” Pozen, supra note 14, at 888; see also id. at 920–39. There is only a small
amount of overlap with the Special Norms, namely between Communicative Exchange and
what Pozen dubs an “unwillingness to compromise or negotiate across branch or party lines.”
Id. at 929 (emphasis removed).
More fundamentally, this Article’s analysis suggests that bad faith may not be the best
frame for conceptualizing and identifying the norms that should discipline Congress’s
constitutional decision-making: bad faith may be unduly narrow. Constitutional decisionmaking appropriately makes stronger demands, on account of the nature of constitutional
domain. Tempered Politics’ demands of Reciprocity and Communicative Exchange better
capture the heightened demands that should apply to decision-making in the constitutional
domain.
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Having described the contents of Reciprocity and Communicative
Exchange, this next subpart justifies those details. Tempered Politics’
contents derive from the core considerations that give rise to the need
for Special Norms: the Arguments from Legitimacy, Political Fraternity,
and Identity.
a.

Political Fraternity

Tempered Politics’ first sub-norm, Reciprocity, facilitates the
selection of impartial constitutional rules by demanding that a
representative be willing to have the position she advocates be applied to
her, both as she actually is and as she best can imagine herself as her
political opponent. Constitutional rules that are impartial in this sense
are suited to the political fraternity that modern democratic
constitutions aim to establish—political relations that reflect citizens’
political equality and mutual regard. Reciprocity’s requirement that a
representative support only those constitutional positions (as framed by
Holism) she reasonably believes her opponents could accept (as
appreciated via the Two Imaginative Leaps) reflects, and helps
construct, political relationships of mutual respect, accommodation,
and citizenship equality.
Tempered Politics’ second sub-norm, Communicative Exchange,
also is tightly connected to political fraternity. Communicative
Exchange’s requirement that the political majority interface with its
opponents for the purpose of jointly determining what is to be done,
and its preference that constitutional decisions be taken by consensus
instead of brute majoritarianism, are suited to cultivating the type of
political fraternity that modern democracies aspire to create.
b.

Enhancing Legitimacy by Facilitating Consensus

Reciprocity and Communicative Exchange jointly facilitate the
creation of a polity that satisfies more-than-minimal philosophical
legitimacy as well as sociological legitimacy, 218 for two distinct reasons.
First, as discussed immediately below in this Subsection, Reciprocity
and Communicative Exchange increase the chance of reaching
consensus, which is legitimacy’s most secure grounding. Second, as

218

See supra notes 112–31 and accompanying text.
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explained below, 219 even when consensus cannot be reached, Reciprocity
and Communicative Exchange encourage the adoption of what might
be called “constitution-worthy” decisions that can satisfy more-thanminimal theories of philosophical legitimacy and that support
sociological legitimacy.
Multiple facets of Tempered Politics enhance the prospects of
achieving consensus. Its sub-norm of Reciprocity channels disputes in
the constitutional domain by constraining the substantive positions
parties may stake out. Holism requires that disputants consider related
circumstances all at once and enables those circumstances to be
appreciated by all sides by means of Communicative Exchange and its
two required imaginative leaps. The insights as to my opponents’
perspectives, and any sympathies that result from placing myself in my
adversary’s shoes and my genuinely aiming to influence and being open
to their influence, may affect my understanding of what positions my
opponent can reasonably be expected to accept. Reciprocity requires
that I only adopt such positions and requires that my opponents do the
same.
Moreover, Tempered Politics channels disputes in a way that
facilitates (though of course does not guarantee) consensus. The
awareness of the fuller context made possible by Holism and
Communicative Exchange may soften some disputes, and perhaps make
some go away. 220 Communicative Exchange’s demand that all parties
have Aim-to-Influence and Openness-to-Being-Influenced invites
persuasion, another avenue for reaching consensus. When persuasion
alone does not lead to agreement, Reciprocity’s constraints on what
substantive positions parties can take, in conjunction with
Communicative Exchange’s Mutual Influence requirement, may reduce
the range of disagreement as compared to what would be found under
Hardball Politics. This compressed range of disagreement may increase
the chances of reaching agreement. Also aiding consensus are any
heightened mutual sympathies that result from Reciprocity’s demand
that each side imagine itself in the other’s position, 221 and from Aim-to-

219
220
221

See infra Section IV.C.3.e.
See, e.g., supra notes 197–200 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text.
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Influence’s encouraging each side to enter her interlocutor’s conceptual
universe so as to effectively engage with her on her own terms. 222
Holism’s cluster analysis may further encourage compromise by
virtue of its effect of placing related matters on the negotiation table at
one time. Communicative Exchange helps each side to understand how
the other side is affected in related situations. This simultaneous
consideration of related issues can be expected to elicit the intensity of
each party’s interests in respect of each issue, which may help identify
intelligible trade-offs across those issues that can lead to consensus
through compromise. Consensus as to constitutional matters is strongly
desirable because it is the most robust ground for philosophical
legitimacy. And consensus is a virtual guarantee of sociological
legitimacy. 223
c.

Other Benefits of Consensus

Consensus is a strong normative good for many reasons
independent of legitimacy. 224 These reasons accordingly bolster the case
for Reciprocity and Communicative Exchange, insofar as both subnorms facilitate consensus. First, persuasion and compromise respect
the agency 225 of fellow citizens because persuasion and compromise
respond to the other’s claims; Reciprocity-compliant unilateralism does
not respect the other’s agency, regardless of how enlightened the
majority’s Reciprocity-compliant position may be. Consensus also
fosters ongoing relationships among competing factions that may allow
each side’s perspectives to transform over time, potentially leading to
cascading convergences and consensus. 226 Compromise tends to be selfreinforcing, sowing the seeds for future good will and ongoing
compromise. Finally, compromise tends towards stable solutions, and

See supra notes 212–16 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 129–31 and accompanying text.
224 This is not to deny that compromise can sometimes be normatively problematic. See
MARGALIT, supra note 209, at 54–62.
225 Agency refers to making choices, and thereafter acting pursuant to those choices, in a
manner that can make a difference in the world. See generally CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, SELFCONSTITUTION: AGENCY, IDENTITY, AND INTEGRITY 84–89 (2009).
226 Cf. SHIFFRIN, supra note 181, at 75. This is how participants in the Utah Compromise
describe what occurred. See Chokshi, supra note 94.
222
223
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stability is important to the ongoing large-scale cooperation among
extensive populations that is a hallmark of modern polities.
It might be objected that compromise in relation to constitutional
rights is a wrongful splitting of the baby. This objection might be valid if
constitutional rights were absolute, but they are not. 227 Insofar as rights’
non-absoluteness reflects a normative conclusion that no right is
sufficiently important to prevail against all competing considerations, 228
a negotiated outcome that permits a right to prevail against some but
not all competing rights and interests should not be facially suspect. 229
Indeed, compromise that allows each party to prevail in some
circumstances, but not others, is more apt to reflect a normatively
proper outcome than is the circumstance where one right unwaveringly
trumps all competing considerations. To put it another way, the
normative significance of constitutional rights is context-sensitive. As
such, the normatively proper reconciliation between rights and
competing commitments can be expected to vary as facts and
circumstances change. 230 Compromise in the service of consensus may
turn out to be a particularly good way to reach normatively appropriate
resolutions of constitutional conflicts.
d.

Jointly Determining Our Political Identity

Tempered Politics’ facilitation of consensus is also beneficial
insofar as how a polity reconciles competing rights and interests is a
substantial determinant of its fundamental identity. 231 Consensus beats
brute force as a mechanism for ensuring that citizens meaningfully
identify with the polity’s identity. Consensus-based identity is
appropriate for a modern constitutional democracy, for who we are as a
polity is appropriately determined by us, not imposed on us by others,
to the maximal possible extent.

See supra Section III.E.
See supra notes 143–41 and accompanying text.
229 For a similar argument, see Robin Fretwell Wilson, Bargaining for Civil Rights: Lessons
from Mrs. Murphy for Same-Sex Marriage and LGBT Rights, 95 B.U. L. REV. 951 (2015).
230 See Rosen, Non-Absolute Constitutional Rights, supra note 51, at 1580–87.
231 See supra Section III.E.
227
228
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Enhancing Legitimacy Where Consensus is Not Possible

Consensus is not always achievable. In this circumstance,
Reciprocity and Communicative Exchange increase the likelihood that a
large heterogeneous polity can satisfy more-than-minimal philosophical
legitimacy. More-than-minimal theories justify political legitimacy on
the ground that a polity’s system for generating legal obligations is
worthy of respect, even though citizens have not actually consented to
the system. 232 Reciprocity and Communicative Exchange are well suited
to generating constitutional decisions that satisfy the demands of these
more-than-minimal theories of political legitimacy insofar as Tempered
Politics encourages and facilitates constitution-worthy decisions. 233
V. FOUR OBJECTIONS
Part V identifies and answers four objections to the Special Norms
Thesis. The Status Quo Objection is that norms more demanding than
Hardball Politics would unduly privilege the status quo, impeding
constitutional progress. The No Stopping Point Objection is that the
domain of constitutional decision-making is not susceptible of
principled containment, which would mean that the Special Norms
Thesis cannot be limited to a subdomain of Congress’s decision-making.
The Mismatch Objection accepts that Special Norms sometimes apply,
but claims they apply to a different domain—only those matters that are
extraordinarily important. Finally, the Theory of the Second Best
Objection is that even if the Special Norms Thesis were correct in theory,
our non-ideal reality warrants its rejection. This final objection
encompasses, though is not limited to, the important criticism that the
Special Norms Thesis is too impractical.

232 Examples include hypothetical consent, see, e.g., RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra
note 114, at 22–28, and epistemic approaches to grounding government authority, see
ESTLUND, supra note 117, at 3–8.
233 Fully defending this proposition requires establishing what conditions must be met to
satisfy more-than-minimal legitimacy, for which there is a vast and complex literature. See, e.g.,
sources cited supra note 232 and accompanying text. Showing how Reciprocity and
Communicative Exchange dovetail with even one theorist’s approach would take more space
than this already lengthy Article can provide.
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These objections provide an opportunity to clarify how the Special
Norms operate in difficult cases and help to identify costs that would
attend acceptance of the Special Norms Thesis. These costs—some of
which are contingent, and others which are unavoidable—are necessary
for Part VI’s all-things-considered analysis as to whether the Special
Norms Thesis should be accepted.
A.

The Status Quo Objection

The Status Quo Objection asserts that norms more demanding than
Hardball Politics would unduly privilege the status quo by impeding
constitutional progress. The objection begins with the observation that
our nation’s most important constitutional advances have come from
sharp battles, not civil seminar-like discussions that led to consensus
and fireside chants of Kumbaya. 234 The Special Norms are problematic,
continues the Objection, insofar as the policies adopted under
Tempered Politics will be less efficacious than what the political
majority could have gotten. This is a natural consequence of
Reciprocity’s constraints on what position the political majority can
take, and of Communicative Exchange’s preference for compromise,
which keeps the numerical majority from maximizing its political
advantage.
For example, the Status Quo Objection claims that the Special
Norms Thesis errs insofar as Tempered Politics’ sub-norm of
Reciprocity would have required abolitionists to imagine themselves as
slaveholders and allowed them to put forward only constitutional
positions that a slaveholder plausibly could have accepted. Likewise,
Communicative Exchange wrongly favors persuasion and compromise
with slaveholders, when the appropriate approach is brute
majoritarianism against the evil of slavery. More generally, the Status
Quo Objection claims that majoritarianism is normatively preferable to
consensus-oriented Tempered Politics when resolving constitutional
disagreements.

234 See supra note 26 (noting that the Special Norms Thesis may not be applicable to a
constitution’s drafting and ratification).
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As a preliminary matter, the Special Norms would not have been
applicable during Reconstruction, 235 and therefore would not have
constrained abolitionists. But this does not substantially blunt the force
of the Status Quo Objection because the Special Norms would have
applied at all other times in our nation’s history, including the Jim Crow
era. So, it is fair to ask whether the Special Norms would have impeded
integration by constraining the constitutional positions integrationists
could have propounded, and by otherwise favoring compromise and
consensus-seeking with segregationists.
In fact, it is impossible to know what effect the Special Norms
would have had on the cause of integration because the question is so
counter-factual. Tempered Politics’ requirements of Reciprocity and
Communicative Exchange would have applied not only to the
integrationists, but also to segregationists. Things could have played out
in one of three ways, none of which would have clearly privileged the
status quo.
First, both the traditional segregationists and the integrationists
might have complied with Tempered Politics. Compliance with
Reciprocity and Communicative Exchange almost certainly would have
altered both sides’ positions and encouraged them to work hard to reach
a consensus outcome. This may have led to agreement. 236 Such
consensus may have prevented the backlash that occurred, and which
long hindered integration. 237 Consensus also may have laid the
groundwork for continued civil dialogue and a growing convergence
between the two sides over time. 238 All in all, Tempered Politics may
have advanced the cause of integration faster and more peacefully than
what actually transpired.

See infra notes 291–95 and accompanying text.
This is not as unlikely as it may sound, because some progressive changes in fact began in
the South before Brown v. Board of Education, including desegregation in sports, police forces,
and some public accommodations. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL
RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 344–442 (2004);
Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, J. AM. HISTORY
81 (1994). There was even a pre-Brown movement toward desegregating schools in Brown’s
own backyard, the state of Kansas. See KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra, at
345.
237 See sources cited supra note 236.
238 See supra notes 224–26 and accompanying text.
235
236
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Second, one side (say the segregationists) may not have complied
with the Special Norms. This would have suspended the integrationists’
need to comply with Communicative Exchange, 239 freeing them of the
requirement of seeking consensus through persuasion and compromise.
Though Reciprocity would still have constrained the integrationists’
constitutional positions, 240 the Special Norms would not have prevented
them from adopting their preferred Reciprocity-compliant position by
simple majority rule. While Reciprocity limits the range of permissible
substantive positions, many options typically remain available. 241
Third, both sides may have complied with the Special Norms but
still have been unable to come to a consensus outcome. Like the second
case, the political majority would then have been free to adopt their
preferred Reciprocity-compliant position through majority rule. 242
More generally, the Special Norms do not threaten to stop progress
in the way a supermajority requirement does. 243 The question for
purposes of the Status Quo Objection is whether Reciprocity (which
likely would have constrained integrationists’ positions to some degree)
and Communicative Exchange (insofar as it favors compromise) unduly
privilege the status quo. While determining what counts as “undue”
ultimately is a difficult normative judgment, undueness depends upon
there being a Gap between the policies adopted under the Special Norms
(SNP) and the policies that would have been adopted under Hardball
Politics (HBP).
Before considering what properly counts as undue, it is important
to observe that the Gap may be smaller than initially supposed. This is
mostly for the reasons mentioned above in relation to desegregation:
The Special Norms also constrain the other side, and may lead to
policies that are not only more stable and enforceable, but that also pave
the way for ongoing convergences and growing consensus. Another
For an explanation as to why, see infra note 287 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 286–87 and accompanying text.
241 See Rosen, Marijuana, supra note 39, at 1042–52.
242 This does not mean the third scenario would have led to the same results as the second,
for Communicative Exchange can affect the majority’s understanding of what positions satisfy
Reciprocity. See supra notes 211–16 and accompanying text.
243 Supermajority rules risk undersupplying decisions insofar as no action can go forward
without a supermajority. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Majority and
Supermajority Rules: Three Views of the Capitol, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1115, 1150 (2007).
239
240
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important factor limiting the Gap is that Reciprocity has an important
internal limit. Reciprocity imposes restrictions only vis-à-vis opponents
who share common ground with me; while Reciprocity requires me to
espouse only those positions my opponents reasonably can be said to
accept, those positions still must be acceptable to me. 244 Reciprocity’s
endogenous self-limit restricts the range of options that fall within SNP,
and is another reason the Gap may be smaller than initially thought.
Even so, the Gap is unlikely to always be zero. So, the question
remains: Does the existence of any Gap amount to an undue privileging
of the status quo? The answer is no. Although compromise sometimes
can be wrongful, political compromise for the purpose of achieving a
stable consensus that permits peaceful ongoing cooperative relations is
ordinarily a strong normative good. 245 It follows that the mere existence
of a Gap does not mean the status quo has been unduly privileged.
While persuasion and compromise almost always will drive a gap
between SNP and HBP, this is not problematic insofar as compromise is
a necessary cost of social life. To the extent that compromise is a
normative good, the Gap is a necessary and normatively
unobjectionable cost.
But because compromise can be wrongful, the Gap potentially can
be normatively problematic. To determine when compromise amounts
to an undue privileging of the status quo, we need a thick normative
theory of compromise. This merits additional study. 246 The thick
theory’s conclusions can, and should, inform how the Special Norms are
operationalized, most especially Communicative Exchange’s preference
for consensus. The Status Quo Objection thus helps identify a
contingent, though not a necessary, cost of the Special Norms Thesis.
B.

The No Stopping Point Objection

Where there is no common ground, Reciprocity imposes no constraint.
See MARGALIT, supra note 209, at 7 (“[C]ompromises are vital for social life, even though
some compromises are pathogenic.”); id. at 37 (“Compromise . . . is cooperation based on
mutual promises,” the “cement of social life.”); id. at 54–55.
246 While Avishai Margalit has given us an extraordinarily illuminating first cut, there is
reason to think it should not be the final word on the subject. See supra note 209 (discussing
Margalit’s work).
244
245
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The No Stopping Point Objection asserts that accepting the Special
Norms Thesis would make the Special Norms applicable to all
congressional decision-making. According to this objection, the effort
to define a domain of constitutional decision-making that extends
beyond the production of constitutional texts leads to a slippery slope
because post-production constitutionalism lacks a principled border to
separate the constitutional and non-constitutional domains. This
objection would make the Special Norms Thesis an oxymoron, for how
can “special” norms apply to everything? But the objection is far more
than semantic. It threatens to collapse the Special Norms Thesis into the
High Equivalence Thesis, making it vulnerable to the three critiques
against Deliberative Democracy. 247
As explained below, there are three versions of the No Stopping
Point Objection. The first two are relatively easy to answer. The third
has more bite, but also is answerable. It follows that post-production
constitutionalism is not inconsistent with there being a finite domain of
congressional constitutional decision-making. This rescues the
possibility that Special Norms can apply to a sub-domain of
congressional decision-making.
1.

First Version

The first version of the No Stopping Point Objection builds on the
Article’s acknowledgment that every congressional action contains at
least one constitutional ingredient, viz., the may question. 248 Because
every congressional action contains at least one constitutional
ingredient, the Special Norms will be triggered every time Congress acts.
Acknowledging this, it might be thought, concedes the validity of the No
Stopping Point Critique.
But it does not, because the may question is only a subset of the
considerations that inform congressional action. The Special Norms are
See supra Section III.B.1. To be clear, the No Stopping Point Objection’s validity would
not destroy the Special Norms Thesis. The Thesis could be rehabilitated either by redefining the
domain of congressional constitutional decision-making, or otherwise recalibrating the domain
to which the Special Norms apply. But because the Objection’s validity would undermine many
of this Article’s arguments for the Special Norms Thesis, it is important to consider it.
248 See supra Section I.A.
247
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inapplicable to the non-constitutional considerations that typically
inform Congress’s whether and what determinations. 249 The Special
Norms’ applicability to the may question accordingly does not mean the
domain of congressional constitutional decision-making is without
limits. Moreover, on account of the Norm of Explicitness, not every
constitutional issue in connection with the may question will trigger a
duty of explicit consideration. 250 For example, constitutional issues that
are well settled generally will not, as discussed above. 251
2.

Second Version

The second version of the No Stopping Point Objection targets the
sub-domains where Congress’s whether or what determinations belong
to constitutional decision-making (namely Institution-Tending and
Rights-Tending 252). It asserts that one or both of these sub-domains
lacks a principled border, with the result that most (or all) congressional
activity can be fitted into it. The response is that although there
inevitably will be ambiguities in application, most congressional action
unambiguously does not fall under any of these sub-domains. This
means the second formulation of the No Stopping Point Objection has
no real traction.
But this version of the No Stopping Point Objection can be
substantially rehabilitated because one of constitutional decisionmaking’s sub-domains, Adequate Realization, is vulnerable to
substantial swelling. What if a representative thought, or claimed to
think, that Adequate Realization of constitutional speech rights required
legislation that provided a substantial floor of goods—say food, housing,
education, and health care? 253 This illustrates that the category of
Adequate Realization conceivably can be very broad. I take up the
response to this form of the No Stopping Point Objection in the next
Subsection. 254
249
250
251
252
253
254

See supra Section I.A.
See supra text accompanying notes 175–80.
See supra text accompanying notes 175–80.
See supra Sections I.B.2, I.B.3.
Cf. SAGER, supra note 48, at 126–27 (propounding a serious claim quite close to this).
See infra text accompanying notes 257–59.
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Third Version

The third version of the No Stopping Point Objection has
substantial purchase. It circles back to the first formulation and avers
that the Article’s acknowledgment that every congressional action raises
a constitutional question (the may question) in effect undermines any
possibility that the Special Norms could apply to only a sub-domain of
congressional decision-making. This is so, the third version insists,
because there is a virtually infinite range of constitutional challenges
that can be brought against a contemplated congressional action. For
example, a member of Congress might think the Tenth Amendment
radically limits Congress’s legislative powers so that regulatory power is
reserved to the states or the people,255 or that all governmental
regulation is presumptively unconstitutional insofar as it interferes with
a citizen’s liberty to do as she wishes. 256
And the range of potential constitutional objections is even greater
on account of the absence of a determinate, a priori line that separates
on-the-wall from off-the-wall constitutional arguments. 257 There are
many instances where constitutional arguments initially thought to be
inconceivably weak became plausible, and sometimes black letter
doctrine. 258 Moreover, continues the third version, a virtually infinite
range of affirmative constitutional claims can be made to demand that
255 Such an objection is not inconceivable under current Tenth Amendment doctrine, under
which Congress alone determines that amendment’s limits on Congress. See Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551–55 (1985).
256 This is not far from Randy Barnett’s view. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004).
257 See BALKIN, supra note 31, at 18–19. Consider the broccoli hypothetical that was used to
challenge the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act. Though virtually no one viewed it as
a serious challenge when it was first asserted, it quickly jumped the divide from off- to on-thewall and ultimately gave rise to new commerce clause doctrine. See Mark D. Rosen &
Christopher W. Schmidt, Why Broccoli? Limiting Principles and Popular Constitutionalism in
the Health Care Case, 61 UCLA L. REV. 66 (2013).
258 Compare Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 80–81 (1872) (peremptorily rejecting
substantive due process argument as self-evidently off-the-wall: “it is sufficient to say that
under no construction of [the Due Process Clause] that we have ever seen, or any that we deem
admissible, can the restraint imposed by the State of Louisiana upon the exercise of their
trade . . . be held to be a deprivation of property . . . .”), with Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905) (holding legislative restriction of baker’s power to agree to work more than sixty hours
per week violative of the Due Process Clause).
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Congress undertake some action. (The second version’s rehabilitated
form, which asserts the potentially infinite scope of Adequate
Realization, is an example. 259) Because so many constitutional claims or
objections always can be raised in relation to congressional action,
continues the third version, accepting the Special Norms Thesis would
mean that the Special Norms would govern an enormous percentage of
the time.
And the third version’s bite can be strengthened even more. The
Special Norms may lead to a gaming of the system in which the political
minority aims to characterize its mere policy preference as a
constitutional claim. The gaming incentive is that Tempered Politics
improves the political minority’s negotiation position by favoring
consensual solutions and discouraging the brute majoritarianism that is
allowed under Hardball Politics. 260
The No Stopping Point Objection is powerful, but there is an
adequate response to it. The No Stopping Point Objection embodies an
anxiety that principled borders cannot be drawn to demarcate the
constitutional and non-constitutional domains. The objection assumes
that it is necessary to clearly identify those borders from the start, and
that an inability to do so undermines the case for the Special Norms
Thesis.
But this assumption is mistaken. As explained above, norms can
develop in an incremental process that begins with only one or a few
consensus cases and builds outward over time to more difficult cases. 261
Demanding rule-like clarity from the start not only is unnecessary, but
is self-defeating insofar as it short-circuits the iterative process of
reflective equilibrium through which clarity is best obtained. 262 The
initial question for purposes of norm development is not whether clear
lines and rules can be identified now, but if there are widely shared
considered judgments that can serve as the norm’s starting points. 263
See supra text accompanying note 253.
They also might think the Special Norms will reduce the likelihood Congress will be able
to go forward with the action they oppose. But that may be mistaken, because the Special
Norms may facilitate congressional action. See supra text accompanying note 173 and Section
IV.C.
261 See supra Section II.D.
262 See supra text accompanying notes 79–90.
263 See supra text accompanying note 79.
259
260
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Norm-development can then proceed, despite initial uncertainties as to
the norm’s scope and content, due to the many coordination benefits
that account for the human propensity to generate norms. 264
This answer, which relies on the properties of norms in general,
fully dispels the No Stopping Point Objection. Assume that the
constitutional domain is not susceptible to determinate a priori borders,
since what counts as on-the-wall and off-the-wall constitutional
arguments is subject to change over time. And assume as well that the
Special Norms create a gaming incentive. Even so, the Special Norms
Thesis is not thereby invalidated, so long as there are some initial
Considered Judgments as to when Special Norms properly apply. 265 The
precise metes and bounds of the domain to which the Special Norms
applies is itself determined by one of the Special Norms, namely the
Norm of Explicitness. 266 So long as the conditions that give rise to
norms pertain (viz., coordination benefits that make norm-development
valuable), and there are Considered Judgments that some matters fall
within the constitutional domain, the process of reflective equilibrium
can be relied upon to specify the Special Norms’ scope and contents
over time. Arguments as to what falls within the domain of
constitutional decision-making will be made within Congress, and it is
Congress’s responsibility to determine what falls within the domain of
constitutional decision-making. 267
More generally, uncertainty as to a norm’s scope and content is a
characteristic of norm-development. That it takes time to work out the
domain to which a norm is applicable is an inevitable cost of creating
norms, but not a fatal blow against norms generally, or to the Special
Norms Thesis in particular. For this reason, the No Stopping Point
Objection is parasitic on there being no persuasive case for the Special
Norms Thesis. If the arguments propounded in Part III establish a
persuasive case for the Special Norms Thesis, the No Stopping Point
Objection fails as an objection, and succeeds only insofar as it identifies
costs of norm-development that must be factored into Part VI’s allthings-considered final accounting.
264
265
266
267

See supra text accompanying notes 80–82.
See supra Section III.A.
See supra Section IV.B.
See supra text accompanying notes 77–86.
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The Mismatch Objection

The Mismatch Objection concedes that Special Norms sometimes
apply to congressional decision-making but asserts that the Special
Norms apply to a different domain—what might be called the Domain
of the Extraordinarily Important. The Objection in effect claims that the
constitutional domain is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. As to
its being over-inclusive, consider the various “constitutional
workarounds” Mark Tushnet has identified, where “constitutional text
obstructing our ability to reach a desired goal” is creatively
circumvented. 268 For example, a plain reading of the Emoluments
Clause would have prevented then-Senator Hillary Clinton from being
appointed Secretary of State. The Secretary of State’s salary had been
adjusted for a cost of living increase during the time Clinton was
Senator, and the Emoluments Clause provides that “[n]o
Senator . . . shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be
appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United
States . . . the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during
such time . . . .” 269 The so-called “Saxbe fix” returned the Secretary of
State’s salary to its pre-cost of living adjustment level. 270 If that is all the
Emoluments Clause demands, continues the Mismatch Objection, it is
hard to understand why congressional decision-making in relation to it
must be governed by Special Norms. In the alternative, the Mismatch
Objection might insist that if the Special Norms Thesis is correct that
Special Norms apply to all constitutional matters, then workarounds
must be rejected as wrongful because they inadequately respect the
constitutional domain.
As to the constitutional domain’s under-inclusiveness, consider the
decision of whether this country should go to war, or whether the
federal government should guarantee unemployment insurance or
health insurance. None of these questions belongs to the constitutional
domain, continues the Mismatch Objection, but all are sufficiently
important that they should be decided by something other than the
268 See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1499, 1503 (2009). I
have simplified Tushnet’s description of a constitutional workaround.
269 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
270 See Tushnet, supra note 268, at 1501.
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ordinary norms of Hardball Politics. After all, it plausibly could be said
that whether there should be unemployment or health insurance
determines the nature of our political fraternity far more than do many
constitutional questions, such as what is demanded by the Emoluments
Clause.
There are two main responses to the Mismatch Objection. 271 First,
the claim that Special Norms should apply to the constitutional domain
does not mean Hardball Politics necessarily governs all other
congressional decisions. There may exist a set of non-constitutional, yet
extraordinarily important decisions, such as whether to go to war.272
The validity of the Special Norms Thesis does not depend on the
conclusion that this extraordinary question should be answered
pursuant to the norms of Hardball Politics. 273
Second, and in the other direction, the Mismatch Objection fails
because all constitutional decisions are appropriately made pursuant to
the Special Norms. The constitutional domain consists of those matters
that determine the nature of our nation’s political fraternity by setting
the decision-making structure that generates legal obligations and that
determines the polity’s core political identity. All these decisions are
appropriately decided pursuant to Special Norms. 274 The Special Norms
Thesis does not fetishize constitutional matters by freezing them
forever, or by disallowing constitutional workarounds. The Thesis only
demands that constitutional decision-making, which certainly would
encompass whether a constitutional workaround should be crafted, be
undertaken in accordance with the Special Norms.
271 Also, some of what the Mismatch Objection takes to be extraordinary-yet-nonconstitutional may properly belong to the domain of the constitutional. For example, perhaps
rights to welfare, medical care, and social security properly are best understood as belonging to
the constitutional dimension. For this suggestion, see Ernest A. Young, The Constitution
Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 422–26 (2007); SAGER, supra note 48, at 87–88, 97–
101.
272 Why such decisions ought to be made under stricter-than-usual decision-making norms,
and what those norms should be, are neither addressed nor answered by the Special Norms
Thesis. The arguments for the Special Norms, which in turn shape the contents of the Special
Norms, are tailored to the constitutional domain, and do not automatically carry over to
extraordinarily important-yet-non-constitutional decisions such as whether to declare war.
273 The Special Norms Thesis would be vulnerable to the Mismatch Objection only if the
Argument from Exclusion were its only justification.
274 See supra Parts III, IV.
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The Theory of the Second Best Objection

Whereas the No Stopping Point and Mismatch Objections attack
the domain to which the Special Norms apply, the final objection takes
aim at the Special Norms themselves. 275 It asserts that the Special Norms
Thesis fails because it assumes ideal conditions that depart too far from
reality. Consider three not-too-difficult-to-anticipate departures from
the ideal conditions that the Special Norms Thesis might seem to
presuppose. First, one side of the dispute may be a norm-scofflaw that
does not abide by the Special Norms. Second, intractable conflict may
make consensus impossible. Third, the Special Norms may be too
complex to be workable in practice.
The theory of the second best teaches that if one optimal condition
in an ideal theory cannot be satisfied, the best solution may require
changing other variables away from what would be optimal under ideal
conditions. 276 The theory gives rise to what might be called the Second
Best Objection: even if the Special Norms Thesis were correct for ideal
circumstances, it might not be desirable in our real world.
The Second Best Objection is a serious one. Its force is best assessed
by a detailed examination of the Special Norms Thesis’s operation under
actual, non-ideal conditions. But one preliminary clarification is
necessary. The Second Best Objection presupposes that the Special
Norms Thesis is the optimal approach in an ideal world. 277 The analysis
that follows accordingly assumes the optimality of the Special Norms
Thesis, both the correctness of the arguments on its behalf (from Part
III) and the exposition of its contents (from Part IV). The question is
whether non-ideal conditions (like norm-scofflaws, intractable conflicts,

275 The final objection thus is structurally similar to the Status Quo Objection insofar as both
target the Special Norms themselves.
276 See generally Richard G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best,
24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956).
277 It is important to distinguish between two different time periods: (1) before the Special
Norms have been accepted, and hence become binding, through acceptance and
internalization; and (2) after the Special Norms have become binding. The Second Best
Objection is properly directed to the second time period. What circumstances must pertain for
the Special Norms to become binding is an important question but is distinct from the Second
Best Objection. See supra text accompanying notes 67–72.
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or the needs of workability) are a basis for rejecting the Special Norms
Thesis in practice.
1.

Norm-Scofflaws

The norms literature recognizes that there always are and will be
scofflaws who disregard norms, and understands that this deviation
from ideal conditions neither undermines the normative case for norms
nor prevents norms from arising. 278 The question remains whether
norm-scofflaws in the specific context of congressional constitutional
decision-making renders the Special Norms Thesis sub-optimal.
A careful consideration of the different types of norm-scofflaws
demonstrates that the Second Best Objection is not a reason for
rejecting the Special Norms Thesis. Consider first an abuser of the
Norm of Explicitness, such as a legislator who tries to game the system
by dressing her policy objections as constitutional objections so as to
obtain the Special Norms’ added negotiation leverage. 279 The Special
Norms Thesis has adequate internal resources to address this scofflaw.
Bad faith attempts to trigger the Special Norms are policed by
Congress’s application of the Norm of Explicitness, 280 for the Special
Norms are not triggered if Congress does not believe they are in the
domain of constitutional decision-making. While congressional selfpolicing presents a risk of “bad faith policing,” the guard against bad
faith policing is the value of the Special Norms themselves, which the
Second Best Objection presumes. Once the Special Norms are in place,
the bulk of representatives can be expected to comply with them, and to
not endanger them by bad faith policing, on account of the norms’
entrenchment as well as the coordination benefits that gave rise to the
Special Norms in the first place.
Next consider Tempered Politics’ handling of norm-scofflaws, i.e.,
those who refuse to follow Tempered Politics. To begin, although an
individual or small group of noncompliant legislators would present an
unfortunate circumstance, it would not affect the Special Norms’ proper

278
279
280

See, e.g., GIBBARD, supra note 55, at 73–80.
See supra text accompanying note 207.
See supra text accompanying note 180.
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operation so long as a sufficient number of legislators were normcompliant. The presence of a single—or even several—scofflaws is not a
sufficiently large deviation from ideal conditions to trigger the Second
Best Objection.
But, some critical mass of scofflaws 281 would. Yet even if there were
a critical mass, this would not be cause for rejecting the Special Norms
Thesis because the Special Norms also have endogenous resources to
manage scofflaws. A critical mass would suspend operation of
Communicative Exchange, which by its nature requires both parties’ 282
participation. Communicative Exchange’s suspension would impose a
substantial cost on the scofflaws, for they would lose the enhancement
of their negotiation position that is provided by Communicate
Exchange’s encouragement of persuasion and compromise in the service
of consensus. This cost may itself discourage some norm-scofflawing,
though it may not be sufficient to completely eliminate it.
But a critical mass of scofflaws should not suspend all the Special
Norms. Explicitness and Proactivity still should be fully operative, as
would Tempered Politics’ sub-norm of Reciprocity. Though it might be
objected that basic fairness demands that norm-scofflawing suspend all
the Special Norms, the considerations that account for the Explicitness
and Proactivity norms lead to the conclusion that they should not be
suspended by virtue of the other side’s malfeasance. 283 The Norm of
Proactivity arises to protect endangered constitutional institutions,284
and the Norm of Explicitness exists insofar as explicit consideration
improves the quality of constitutional decision-making. 285 It would
make no sense to allow either of these Special Norms to be suspended
due to the other side’s malfeasance. Ignoring impending harm to a

281 A game theoretic analysis might be useful in identifying the parameters of that critical
mass. I leave that important project to another day.
282 If the divergent positions on a constitutional dispute were fractured into more than two
groups, and more than two but less than all the groups were willing to abide by Tempered
Politics, then Communicative Exchange should be applicable to the subset of disputants that
continue to abide by the Special Norms.
283 This does not mean these norms are categorical, but only that they are not defeasible on
grounds of the other side’s malfeasance.
284 This is one of several considerations that give rise to the Norm of Proactivity. See supra
Section IV.A. The argument above in text applies mutatis mundi to all of them.
285 See supra text accompanying notes 165–68.
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constitutional institution, or yielding explicitness’ decision-making
benefits, does not benefit the norm-abider, but only threatens systemic
harm. If conditions appropriately trigger Explicitness or Proactivity, but
the other side does not act in accordance with the Special Norms, the
appropriate response is to penalize them by suspending Communicative
Exchange and publicly calling them out. 286
The basic fairness objection may seem to have substantial bite in
respect of Tempered Politics’ sub-norm of Reciprocity. Why, it might be
asked, should Reciprocity constrain my substantive constitutional
position if the other side does not comply? The answer is that
Reciprocity appropriately disciplines a decision-maker, even if her
opponents do not comply with it, on account of what constitutional
decision-making consists in. The sub-norm of Reciprocity helps ensure
the generation of constitution-worthy outcomes: outcomes that do not
undermine legitimacy, that establish the political fraternity appropriate
for a modern heterogeneous democracy, and that hold out the prospect
of constituting the identity that the polity’s citizens—including the heirs
of today’s norm-scofflaws—can ultimately call their own. 287 Only
constitution-worthy decisions have these properties. The intrinsic and
instrumental benefits of constitution-worthy constitutional decisions
would be lost were norm-scofflaws treated as a license for Hardball
Politics.
None of this is to deny that norm-scofflawing is deeply
troublesome. Scofflawing before the Special Norms are entrenched risks
impeding the norms’ acceptance. And if scofflawing occurs too
frequently after entrenchment, the Special Norms may be destroyed. But
this is true of all norms. Norms come into existence, and persist, only if
there is substantial compliance. And yet norms arise and persist.
The hardest challenge raised by scofflaws is whether the Special
Norms can become entrenched norms in the first place. As explained
286 For this reason, the Special Norms’ efficacy may depend upon the public’s participation
in holding legislators accountable to them.
287 It might be thought that a non-reciprocal reciprocity requirement would create a
pernicious incentive to the political minority, since the political majority must comply with
Reciprocity regardless of the political minority’s behavior. But there is no pernicious incentive
because norm-scofflaws suffer in two ways. The political majority’s ability to understand its
opponent’s position may be hindered, thereby reducing benefits they would likely enjoy under
Reciprocity. And norm-scofflaws sacrifice Communicative Exchange’s negotiation benefits.
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above, this Article mostly leaves this important family of
implementation questions for another day. 288 But this much can be said.
Establishing the Special Norms would require hard work by norm
entrepreneurs at the start, who must have the vision of a better way of
conducting constitutional decision-making and must be willing to
forbear the short-term political advantages they would otherwise enjoy
under the (then-prevailing) norms of Hardball Politics. The motivation
for such foresight and forbearance would be a conviction that the
Special Norms are important and worthy of sacrifice—the very case this
Article has tried to make. But once accepted, the Special Norms have
sufficient internal resources to deal with intermittent scofflaws.
2.

Intractable Conflict

Although the Second Best Objection on account of norm-scofflaws
largely dissipates under inspection, the objection has real traction in
relation to intractable conflict. This second form of the objection posits
enduring intractable conflicts within a society. Conflict’s stipulated
persistence makes it a condition that properly triggers the theory of the
second best, demanding that we consider whether such conflict renders
the Special Norms Thesis suboptimal.
Enduring conflict actually grounds two related second-best
objections. First, persistent conflict might be thought to be inconsistent
with the Special Norms’ pre-conditions. To put it bluntly, what is the
point of Reciprocity and Communicative Exchange if intractable
conflict means no one’s views are susceptible of change? Second,
persistent conflict unwinds the Special Norms’ animating goal of
seeking consensus.
a.

The Objection’s Limited Reach

The intractable conflict form of the Second Best Objection relies on
a non-axiomatic, and ultimately empirical, assumption. It assumes that
conflict as to constitutional matters—the fundamental way a society
structures its political relations—is intractable to a degree as to make the

288

See supra text accompanying notes 67–72.
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Special Norms Thesis suboptimal. Its empirical foundation limits the
Objection’s reach in three respects.
First, because the intractable conflict form of the Second Best
Objection rests on empirics, it cannot be universally correct as a
conceptual or theoretical matter. Instead, whether this Objection’s
assumption of enduring intractable conflict holds must be determined
on a society-by-society basis. This Objection accordingly cannot ground
a general rejection of the Special Norms Thesis.
Second, it seems unlikely that the Second Best Objection’s
assumption of intractable conflict would hold in every possible grouping
of people. To put it more constructively, this form of the Second Best
Objection suggests that attention should be given to the criteria for
determining both the size of polities and who properly qualifies as a
citizen.
Third, even where there is deep conflict, this form of the Second
Best Objection holds only if conflict is intractable. Intractability
presupposes that conflict is static, rather than dynamically subject to
change. This presupposition is hardly self-evident, because external
interventions might be capable of reducing conflict. And there indeed
have been many successful interventions of this sort in the history of
politics. For example, intra-society conflict has been substantially
reduced by Locke’s and other enlightenment thinkers’ advocacy of
toleration and disestablishmentarianism, which grew out of a deliberate
effort to reformulate citizens’ understanding of the relationship between
politics and ultimate truth. 289 The Special Norms Thesis is another
(perhaps more modest) proposed intervention, insofar as it aims to
facilitate consensus as to foundational political relations through the
aegis of Tempered Politics’ requirements of Reciprocity and
Communicative Exchange.
Put a bit differently, the intractable conflict form of the Second
Best Objection succeeds only if we have come to the “end of history” 290
of reducing political conflict. Such a pessimistic position would require

289 See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 114, at y; Mark D. Rosen, Religious
Institutions, Liberal States, and the Political Architecture of Overlapping Spheres, 2014 U. ILL. L.
REV. 737, 758–68 (discussing Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration).
290 See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992)
(positing the possibility of an endpoint to the evolution of political arrangements).
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reasoned argument, and surely cannot be simply presumed. Too ready
acceptance of this form of the Second Best Objection may selfdefeatingly hinder humanity’s collective advance down the road of
conflict-reduction. The Special Norms Thesis may be a vehicle for
transporting us down that desirable road.
b.

Where the Special Norms Thesis is Inapplicable

It cannot be denied that some political societies have
extraordinarily deep conflict—think of present-day Iraq and Syria.
Where there is such conflict, the Special Norms indeed do not apply. 291
Yet this conclusion emerges not in response to the Second Best
Objection but is endogenous to the Special Norms Thesis. This is
because the Special Norms Thesis is implicit in the social practice of
constitutional democracies that aim to establish substantially legitimate
polities that are marked by political fraternity of the sort described
herein, and that have a political identity with which all citizens plausibly
can call their own. 292 Insofar as the Special Norms Thesis is constitutive
of polities that aspire to satisfying these demands of legitimacy, political
fraternity, and identity, the Special Norms Thesis is inapplicable to
polities that disavow these goals.
For example, if cleavages among groups are sufficiently severe, it
may not be possible to establish a single polity that aims to satisfy the
demands of legitimacy, political fraternity, and identity. Societies with
deep intractable conflict typically can satisfy these demands only if all
groups within the society agree to a decentralized political structure,
such as a federalist or consociational unions. 293 Where severe cleavages
are coupled with a subgroup’s unalterable commitment to full political
independence, a single polity cannot satisfy the demands of legitimacy,
political fraternity, and identity. Without taking a position as to whether
291 This presumes, without specifying, an appropriate time frame over which intractability is
to be determined. The possibility that cleavages might disappear over a century is not relevant
for determining the applicability of the Special Norms Thesis. The relevant period of time is
probably closer to a half generation, though this topic deserves more consideration.
292 See supra Part III.
293 See generally AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE
EXPLORATION (1977). The Special Norms Thesis is fully applicable to such polities, though the
substantive answers to constitutional questions that emerge will diverge substantially from the
answers generated in those polities aiming to create a unitary political identity.
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creating or sustaining a single polity in that circumstance is normatively
justified, this much can safely be said: the Special Norms do not apply,
because the predicates that give rise to them are absent. 294 For this
reason, the Special Norms would have been inapplicable in the
immediate aftermath of the Civil War, when the Reconstruction era
amendments were ratified. 295 That the Special Norms are not universally
applicable is not an objection to the Special Norms Thesis, but an
implication of it.
3.

Unworkably Complex

A final version of the Second Best Objection is that Tempered
Politics’ requirements are unworkably complex. This form of the Second
Best Objection fails for two reasons. First, although spelling out
Reciprocity’s and Communicative Exchange’s requirements required
many law review pages, 296 this does not mean that complying with
Tempered Politics would be complex or otherwise unworkable.
Consider the activity of riding a bicycle. Although written instructions
for someone unfamiliar with riding would be lengthy and complex,
bicycle riding is quickly internalized as a new rider quickly finds the
activity to be second-nature. The same would be true, I suspect, with
Tempered Politics. I have labored to detail its requirements because it is
novel, but its core is an orientation towards consensus that could readily
become second-nature to legislators.
Second, if some aspects of this Article’s specifications of Tempered
Politics turned out to be overly burdensome, reflective equilibrium
permits those problematic requirements to be rejiggered or outright
rejected. Or if Tempered Politics’ requirements should prove
unworkable in respect of specific congressional decision-making, the

294 This does not mean that those societies’ constitutional decision-making is properly
governed by the norms of Hardball Politics. This issue deserves future attention.
295 This is because the confederate states wanted to secede but were not permitted to. For a
detailed discussion of the Hardball Politics used by the Reconstruction Congress to ratify the
post-Civil War Amendments, see ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 4, at 99–119.
296 See also Rosen, Marijuana, supra note 39, at 1042–52 (using ten pages to explain
Reciprocity’s application to extraterritoriality analysis).
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Special Norm of Explicitness permits the suspension of Tempered
Politics’ demands vis-à-vis just those decisions. 297
For these reasons, the unworkability version of the Second Best
Objection does not disprove the Special Norms Thesis. Instead, it serves
the important role of identifying transition costs of specifying the
Special Norms’ contents. As such, this version of the Second Best
Objection addresses the Special Norms Thesis’s affirmative claim (i.e.,
the Special Norms’ contents), but not the Thesis’s negative claim (that
constitutional decisions should not be undertaken under the norms that
apply to ordinary politics). 298 The potential transition costs spotlighted
by the unworkability objection is relevant to the all-things-considered
calculus regarding the Special Norms Thesis’s affirmative claim, and for
that reason are taken account of in the next Part. But transition costs
cannot on their own defeat the Special Norms Thesis, on account of the
potential benefits that are held out by the Thesis’s negative claim.
CONCLUSION: THE FINAL ACCOUNTING
A concrete understanding of the array of constitutional decisions
Congress must make 299 gives rise to a preliminary Considered Judgment
that those decisions should be taken under something other than the
norms that apply to Congress’ ordinary political decisions. 300 The
Article then developed four arguments that ground those Considered
Judgments, 301 extended the Special Norms Thesis’s negative claim to the
entire domain of Congress’s constitutional decision-making, 302 and that
provided the conceptual resources for fleshing out the contents of the
Special Norms that should apply to Congress. 303
And now for the final accounting. First, consider the Special
Norms Thesis’s benefits. Special Norms have the capacity to generate a
See supra text accompanying notes 173–76.
See supra note 24 and accompanying text (identifying the Special Norms Thesis’s
negative and affirmative claims).
299 See supra Part I.
300 See supra Section III.A.
301 See supra Sections III.B–E.
302 See supra Sections III.B–E.
303 See supra Part IV.
297
298
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polity that is more-than-minimally philosophically legitimate, and that
is sociologically legitimate. 304 Special Norms can help create the sort of
political fraternity that large, diverse modern democracies aim to
establish. 305 And Special Norms are appropriate for constitutional
decisions that account for the polity’s core identity. 306 These benefits are
usefully contextualized by considering the only alternatives to the
Special Norms Thesis. The Low Equivalence Thesis falls short on all
three of these criteria. 307 The High Equivalence Thesis does not, but it
falls prey to other pitfalls. In misconceiving the nature of politics, the
High Equivalence Thesis prescribes decision-making norms that are
both conceptually and pragmatically ill-suited to the domain of ordinary
politics. 308 The Special Norms Thesis is the middle path between the
polar opposite extremes that the Equivalence Theses stake out. The
Special Norms Thesis makes heightened demands for the appropriate
sub-domain of public decision-making. Its alternatives do not.
Now consider the Special Norms Thesis’s costs. Explicitness’
requirement that Congress forthrightly address constitutional issues
when they arise, and Tempered Politics’ requirement of Communicative
Exchange, risk bogging down the legislative process. 309 But Tempered
Politics might have the opposite effect of facilitating congressional
action because it encourages responsible decision-making in the
constitutional domain. 310 And if this did not turn out to be the case—if
Tempered Politics generally, or in some circumstances, interfered with
Congress’s functioning—the Norm of Explicitness permits waiver of the
other Special Norms in just those cases. 311 So, to the extent boggingdown costs were real, they may turn out to be only the short-lived costs
of norm-development. When properly specified, the Special Norms
have the capacity to sidestep bogging-down costs.
A second family of costs is a byproduct of the fact that the Special
Norms erect a two-track process in which Special Norms apply to
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311

See supra Section III.C.
See supra Section III.D.
See supra Section III.E.
See supra Section III.B.2.a.
See supra Section III.B.1.
See supra text accompanying notes 170–71.
See supra text accompanying note 173.
See supra Section IV.B.3.
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constitutional decision-making and other norms apply to nonconstitutional matters. To begin, a two-track system requires definition
of each track’s borders, as to which there undoubtedly will be
uncertainty. But this is the type of cost that attends all normdevelopment, and that can be expected to diminish over time.
Transition costs in connection with norm-generation are unavoidable.
They are properly weighed against the Special Norms’ promised
benefits, 312 but are not reasons on their own for rejecting the Special
Norms Thesis.
Further, a two-track system opens the door to the inequitable
circumstance where the good guys comply with the Special Norms while
norm-scofflaws play Hardball Politics. But proper specification of the
Special Norms should ensure that these are mostly phantom costs. A
properly calibrated Explicitness Norm should countermand efforts to
game the system. And because norm-noncompliance frees the other side
from the requirements of Communicative Exchange (the Special Norm
that most benefits political minorities), would-be scofflaws might be
inclined to comply most if not all the time. 313
The two-track system has distributional consequences because
Tempered Politics’ preference for consensus over brute majoritarianism
enhances the political minority’s negotiation position. But many
normatively problematic distributional consequences can be avoided by
proper specification of the Special Norms. For example, while the
Special Norms’ negotiation benefits may incentivize political minorities
to dress their policy claims as constitutional ones, 314 this gaming cost
can be checked by proper specification of the Norm of Explicitness,
which determines when a genuine constitutional claim triggers
application of the other Special Norms. 315 The degree to which the
Norm of Explicitness eliminates this gaming cost turns on the empirical
question of how expertly Congress operationalizes the norm.
Yet not all distributional consequences would be eliminated. The
Special Norms’ enhancement of the political minority’s position can be
expected to impede constitutional change relative to what would occur
312
313
314
315

See supra Section V.B (discussing the No Stopping Point Objection).
See supra Section V.D.1 (discussing the Second-Best Objection).
See supra text accompanying note 260.
See supra Section IV.B (discussing Explicitness).
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under a one-track system where Hardball Politics were the only
operative norm, creating what this Article calls a “Gap.” 316 Although
ascertaining whether there is a Gap is more subtle than at first appears
(because sometimes the Special Norms may bring about change that
otherwise would not occur), it is unlikely that the Gap always will be
zero. 317 But the existence of a Gap is not per se normatively
problematic. 318 Compromise-generating Gaps are a necessary and
normatively unobjectionable cost of securing stable social relations.
Determining whether any Gap amounts to an undue privileging of the
status quo ultimately requires a thick theory of compromise that lies
beyond this Article’s scope. 319 It must be acknowledged that the Special
Norms Thesis carries a risk of undue privileging, at least until an
adequate theory of compromise has been developed.
A final cost would be if the Special Norms’ requirements operated
as a suicide pact, demanding consensus through persuasion and
compromise where consensus were unattainable. 320 But this cost is also
avoided by proper specification of the Special Norms. The Special
Norms encourage, but do not require, consensus. Constitutional
decisions can be rendered by mere majoritarian decision-making where
consensus cannot be reached, so long as the political majority’s position
complies with Reciprocity. And the Special Norms Thesis recognizes
that the Special Norms may not be applicable at all to some countries,
and at certain times. 321
In short, while some costs invariably would attend normdevelopment, many of the Special Norms’ costs ultimately can be
contained, if not altogether eliminated, once the norms have been
properly specified. And though determining whether the Special Norms’
distributional consequences are normatively problematic turns on a
thick theory of political compromise, compromise is a strong normative
good most of the time, and the domain of rotten compromises that are
to be categorically avoided is limited. From this it follows that most of
See supra Section V.A (discussing the Status Quo Objection).
Id.
318 See supra text accompanying notes 244–46.
319 See supra text accompanying notes 244–46.
320 See supra Section V.D.2 (discussing the possibility that intractable conflict renders the
Special Norms Thesis sub-optimal pursuant to the Theory of the Second Best).
321 See supra Section V.D.2
316
317
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the Special Norms’ distributional consequences likely would be the
normatively unobjectionable costs of securing peaceful and stable social
relations among politically equal citizens.
In conclusion, while the Special Norms Thesis carries some costs,
so do all alternatives to the Special Norms Thesis. The question boils
down to this: setting aside the Special Norms’ phantom costs, do the
transition costs associated with norm-development, in conjunction with
the Special Norms’ ineradicable distributional costs, outweigh its
benefits such that the Special Norms Thesis is less attractive than its
alternatives? On account of the Special Norms Thesis’s potential
benefits, the answer would seem to be “no.” All-things-considered, the
Special Norms should be the governing standards when Congress
engages in constitutional decision-making.

